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NOTES
LIABILITY OF NEWSPAPER FOR NEGLIGENT MISSTATEMENTS*
THE GATHERING and dissemination of information by a modem newspaper
is an extensive but rapid-fire process in which errors are bound to occur.
Although these mistakes sometimes result in injury to readers, redress has
rarely been sought except when it was thought that the misstatements could
be classified as libelous. But in two recent suits against newspapers, attempts
were made to impose liability for non-libelous misstatements. In one, plaintiff
alleged she suffered severe injury through the use of a formula for dandruff
remover, negligently recommended as a reliable remedy in a feature article
written by one of the defendant's staff writers.1 In the other, plaintiff alleged
that reading an Associated Press dispatch erroneously reporting the death
of his father had caused nervous shock and physical injuries. 2 Both complaints
were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Whether his complaint is framed in terms of negligent misrepresentation
or deceit, a plaintiff who attempts to impose liability for misstatement upon
a newspaper will encounter difficulty in stating a conventional cause of
action. In the single action of this sort which had heretofore been brought
the issue was not squarely presented.3 But strong precedent is furnished by
a holding that a ticker service company is not liable to the general public
for its erroneous news reports, 4 that decision being based on the theory
that the obligations of a ticker service to the public are the same as those
of a newspaper.5 This paucity of direct precedent would seem to leave courts
*MacKown v. Illinois Pub. & Print. Co., 2S9 Ill. App. 59, 6 N. E. (2d) 526 (1937);
Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 68 P. (2d) 168 (N. M. 1937).
1. MacKown v. Illinois Pub. & Print Co., 289 Ill. App. 59, 6 N. E. (2d) 526
(1937), (1937) 37 CoL. L REv. 1025.
2. Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 68 P. (2d) 168 (N. M. 1937). Plaintiff's wife
also sought to recover for miscarriage and injury to child caused by the shock of reading
about her father-in-law's death.
3. Herrick v. Evening Exp. Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Atl. 16 (1921). See
note 12, infra.
4. Jaillet v. Cashman, 115 Misc. 383, 189 N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921), off'd,
235 N. Y. 511, 139 N. E. 714 (1923). Suit v'as brought by a customer who read the
report over his broker's ticker. The court emphasized the absence of any contract
between the customer and the ticker company, thereby indicating that a different result
might have been reached had the broker himself suffered injury. Whatever basis
there may be for this distinction in the case of a ticker service with a limited number
of subscribers, it would seem highly superficial to make recovery against a nevspaper
depend on whether or not the reader had purchased the paper and so "contracted' with
the publisher. Even if a contract were found, courts would probably be no more willing
to say that a newspaper warranted that the material published was correct, or owed
a duty to use due care, than they would be to find a duty in tort
5. For other indications of a reluctance to impose liability, see Green, Note (1931)
21 ILL. L REv. 49, 51; Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 185, 174 N. E. 441, 446
(1931).
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relatively unfettered in their disposition of these suits, for the doctrines
developed to govern the actionability in general of negligent misrepresenta-
tions furnish no guide to the treatment of the instant situation. The propo-
sition that negligent language is never actionable has been almost completely
undermined,0 but liability is still carefully restricted to those situations in
which the courts can, or will, elicit a "duty."' 7 No meaningful generalization
as to when this duty will be found can be drawn from the cases ;" the danger
of imposing a duty where reliance on the representation might prove un-
limited and the liability consequently overwhelming has assumed at least a
verbal importance, 9 but so flexible a criterion invites manipulation. Indeed
the doctrinal basis for imposing liability in this field enables courts, if so
inclined, to impose liability for some types of newspaper misstatements but
not for others. Thus the court in the nervous shock case rested its refusal
to recognize a duty on the unforeseeability of unreasonable risk of harm to
a plaintiff injured through such an unusual sequence of events ;10 it did not
say that a newspaper would never be under a duty to prevent misstate-
ments. 11' And in many states this type of misstatement by a newspaper
would never give rise to liability, for injuries resulting through nervous
6. See Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14 HARv. L. REv. 184;
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HARv. L. Rav. 415; Bohlen,
Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 732.
7. The concept of duty in these cases is that articulated by Justice Cardozo in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
8. A duty has been found in the relationship of the issuer of a certificate or abstract
to any party to whom he directly delivers it and whom he specifically knows will rely
upon it: Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) ; Anderson v. Spries-
tersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166 (1912) ; a prospective bailee to his bailor: Inter-
national Prod. Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927) ; a trustee to his
cestui: Doyle v. Chatham & P. N. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930); a cus-
todian of municipal records to purchasers of realty: Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn.
84, 240 N. W. 116 (1931) ; cf. telegraph company to sendee: Comment (1937) 37 Cot.
L. Ray. 980, n. 1. It has not been found in the relationship of the issuer of a certificate
or abstract to anyone likely to rely on it: National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S.
195 (1879), National Steel and Iron Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N. E. 833 (1924),
Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); the purchaser of a draft
to the drawee: Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & S. B. Co., 245 N. Y. 377, 157 N. E.
272 (1927).
9. Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Creedon v.
Automatic Vot. Mach. Co., 243 App. Div. 339, 276 N. Y. Supp. 609 (4th Dep't 1935).
10. Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 68 P. (2d) 168, 174 (N. M. 1937). The court
stated that there was no appreciable risk that the death of a 70-year old father would
so shock the son and particularly the daughter-in-law. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
§312, Comments b, c, §313. When a sendee of a telegram suffers mental anguish
because he is erroneously led to believe a person dead, recovery is not allowed unless
the company had notice of the sendee's interest. (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 170.
11. "The wrong, if any, was done to" the man whose death.was erroneously re-
ported. Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 68 P. (2d) 168, 174 (N. M. 1937). The court in
the MacKown case relied in part on cases holding that no action lies for injurious
reliance on advice offered by friends and neighbors; but this doctrine is inept when
advice is offered by an agency with the prestige and authority of a newspaper.
NOTES
shock, particularly those caused by fear of harm to a third person, are not
redressable.12 It might be easier to find a duty by framing the action in
deceit, as the duty in deceit extends to all whom defendant might reason-
ably expect to rely on his representations.13 In such an action, however, it
would be necessary to meet the additional requirement of scienter.14 While
many courts have applied various scienter formulas which virtually imposed
liability for proof merely of negligence,' 5 and a few have gone so far as
to hold that the proof of negligence was sufficient,10 these developments have
been confined entirely to commercial transactions where benefit to the mis-
representor is induced.' 7
Even if these difficulties could be overcome, plaintiff, whatever the theory
of his complaint, would still be required to show negligence. Since the news-
paper is ordinarily under the exclusive control of the publisher and since
knowledge of the circumstances causing the misstatement is beyond reach
of the plaintiff, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might be invoked. But that
doctrine is said to apply only when the circumstances causing harm do not
ordinarily occur unless someone was negligent.la And the frequency of error
12. Herrick v. Evening Exp. Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 At. 16, 23 A. L. R. 358
(1921), (1922) 6 MiNw. L Rxv. 321; HAwEa, TouRs (1933) §67.
13. 2 Coostay, ToRTs (4th ed. 1932) §358; HI-am,, Tous (1933) §21& That
the duty in deceit is broader than the duty in actions based on negligence is clearly
indicated in Ultramares v. Touche, .255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. F. 441 (1931). In that case
public accountants who had certified a false balance sheet were held liable in deceit,
but not in negligent misrepresentation, to creditors and investors to whom their em-
ployer exhibited the certificate.
14. HARPE, Tours (1933) §221.
15. Liability has been imposed for "reckless indifference": Cooper v. Schlesinger,
111 U. S. 148 (1884) ; Balderston v. Integrity Trust, 314 Pa. 58, 170 At. 282 (1934);
a false pretense of exact knowledge: Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. F.
'414 (1895) ; a failure to use reasonable care to ascertain the truth: Giddings v. Bak=er,
80 Tex. 308, 16 S. NV. 33 (1891) ; Peake v. Thomas, 222 Ky. 405, 300 S. IV. 835 (1927) ;
a belief not founded on reasonable grounds: Pickrell & Craig v. Bollinger-Babbage
Co., 204 Ky. 314, 264 S. V. 737 (1924); Packard Phoenix Motor Co. v. McRuer,
41 Ariz. 450, 19 P. (2d) 332 (1933); and by creating a presumption of knowledge:
Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899); Unitype Co. v. Ashcraft Bros., 155
N. C. 63, 71 S. E. 61 (1911). See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act
(1933) 43 YALE L. J. 226, 234; Green, Deceit (1930) 16 VA. L. Rpy. 749; Kirgis,
Innocence and CulpaNlity in Misrepresentation (Unpublished thesis in Yale Law School
I'brary, 1935-36).
16. Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S. V. 742 (1888); Giddings & Giddings v.
Baker, 80 Tex. 308, 16 S. V. 33 (1891) (justified by abolition of forms of action).
Negligence principles are evidently also applied in three states under statutes pro-
viding that an action for deceit will lie for "the assertion as a fact, of that which is
not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true." CAL. Crv.
CoDE (Deering, 1937) § 1710, Washington Lumber & M. Co. v. McGuire, 213 Cal. 13,
1 P. (2d) 437 (1931); Morr. Rv, CovE (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 7575;
N. D. Comp. LAws AN. (1913) § 5943. See Roper v. Noel, 32 S. D. 405, 143 N. IV.
130 (1913).
17. See cases cited mspra note 15.
18. HAnRPa, TouRs (1933) §77.
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in newspaper reports'0 probably is the inevitable result of the speed and
pressure necessary to the publication of a modern daily. Further difficulty
in establishing negligence might be encountered when the misstatements are
found in reproductions of press dispatches, 20 since courts are likely to hold
that the status of the news service agency is that of an independent con-
tractor 2' for whose mistakes the publisher would not be responsible. Respon-
sibility for printing a false press dispatch might conceivably be founded,
however, on negligence for failure to make an independent check.
The flexibility of doctrine in this field should leave the courts free to
recognize more important policy considerations and, by adroit use of the
duty concept, to impose different standards of liability for different types of
misstatement. It would seem imprudent to extend liability for the publica-
tion of news stories beyond that already imposed for libel. While the risk
of personal injury from misstatements is exceedingly remote in the case of
ordinary news items, reliance upon such information as stock market quo-
tations, shipping news, or even an important current event, may be so wide-
spread that the fastening of legal responsibility would increase the risks and
expenses of newspaper publishing to an extent entirely out of proportion
to the benefits obtained; for time could not be taken to verify news stories
without making rapid dissemination of up-to-date news impossible. But
speed is not essential in the publication of the advice of various sorts which
newspapers dispense, and stricter standards might well be set up for such
matters. While faith cannot be placed in such balderdash as racing or market
tips, it is reasonable for the reader to expect that no deleterious effects will
result from the use of any preparations or remedies recommended in a news-
paper article. The infliction of liability in such cases would force the news-
paper either to extend to its own columns the elaborate voluntary censorship
now frequently exercised over questionable advertisements,2 2 or to discon-
tinue publication of such material.
19. One study revealed an amazing number of errors in straight news stories alone,
340 being discovered in 450 stories published by three Minnesota daily papers. Charn-
ley, A Study of Newspaper Accuracy (1936) 13 JOURNALISM. Q. 394.
20. Republication is no defense to an action for libel. COOLEY, TORTS (4th ed.
1932) § 161. Contra: Layne v. Tribune, 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933), 33 CoL. L.
REV. 373, (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 1032. But in the law of libel negligence is irrelevant
except as to the extent of damages. HALE & BENso,, LAW OF THE PR ss (2d ed.
1933) 126.
21. The Associated Press is a cooperative organization whose membership consists
not of the publishing company but of individuals who are the sole or part owners!
of newspapers or an executive officer of the publishing company. 1 LAW OF THE Asso-
CIATED PRESS (1914) 694, By-Laws, Art. II, Sec. 1.
22. See Handler, False and Misleading Adverlising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22, 45.
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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIR MAIL ACT OF 1934*
THE TRANSPORTATION industry as a whole has proven to be extremely
susceptible to the ravages of price wars. Heavy fixed charges occasioned
by permanent investment in rights of way and stations, which may not be
shifted to less competitive routes, and the impossibility of estimating the
cost of carrying any particular item of freight have caused the carriers to
transport marginal freight at rates that will produce any residue over and
above out-of-pocket costs.' The air transport industry would seem to be
no exception, for almost half of its total capital is invested in land and per-
manent improvements. 2 But in view of the fact that passenger and express
revenues have constituted only a minor part of the industry's gross income,3
no ruinous rate wars as to those services have as yet developed. Certain
provisions of the Air Mail Act of 1934,4 however, seem destined to introduce
cut rate bidding for the mail contracts, which until recently supplied the
major portion of the industry's revenues. This trend is clearly demonstrated
by the recent experience of one of the larger lines.
In December of 1935, Transcontinental and Western Air, Incorporated,
applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for permission to institute
passenger and express service between Albuquerque, New Mexico, and San
Francisco, California, via Winslow, Arizona. The Commission decided that
it had jurisdiction to entertain the application,0 but denied the desired per-
mission on the ground that the contemplated expansion fell within the ban
of Section 15 of the Act. This section provides that "no air-mail contractor
shall be allowed to maintain passenger and express service off the line of
his air-mail route which in any way competes with passenger or express
service available upon another air-mail route." The proposed off-line service
would have connected at Winslow with T. W. A.'s mail route from Los
*Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., San Francisco Operation, 220 L C. C. 163
(1937).
1. See FENELON, RAILvAY EcoNOMics (1932) c. 10; LoCKLN, Eco-o.omcs op
TRANSPORTATION (1935) c. 7.
2. Air Mail Compensation, 206 I. C. C. 675, 704 (1935). The fixed investment
in land, buildings, and improvements of major air lines ranges from $00 to $500 per
mile of route. SN. Doc. No. 15, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 55. Tremendous ground
costs have destroyed the industry's mobility. See MOuLrOx, TnE AMHEcm; Tnmxs-
PORTATION PROBLEM (1933) 723; David, Federal Regulation of Airplane Common
Carriers (1930) 6 J. LAND & PuB. Ur. EcoN: 359. But see Watkins, The Economic
Prospects of Air Transport (1929) 4 P. U. FoRT. 332.
3. As recently as 1932, 80% of the industry's total revenue came from govern-
ment mail contracts, and only 209 from passenger and e-xpress services. DODD, FXNAN-
cukm PoLcrms i THE AviATioN INDUSTRY (1933) 166.
4. 48 STAT. 933 (1934), as amended 48 STAT. 1243 (1934) and 49 STAT. 614
(1935), 39 U.S.C. §469 (Supp. 1936).
5. Since 1935 passenger travel has produced more than half of the industry's
revenue. NEws-Wnx , Aug. 17, 1935, p. 26. Today passenger trade has become so
important that rate wars in that service appear unavoidable. Tnm, Nov. 15, 1937,
p. 33.
6. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., San Francisco Operation, 213 L C. C
551 (1936), affd, 214 I. C. C. 552 (1936).
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Angeles to New York, thereby giving T. W. A. a transcontinental line from
San Francisco to New York. For this reason the Commission decided that
the proposed service would compete with passenger travel over United
Airline's mail route from San Francisco to New York in spite of the fact
that the terminal cities would be the only stops common to both lines.1
This interpretation of the clause "in any way competes," though warranted
by the wording of the Act, will probably have an inhibitive effect upon the
development of air transportation. As all of the major mail routes have at
least one important city of call in common with nearby paralleling routes,
little beneficial expansion in passenger service is possible which would not
give the expanding concern two points of call in common with a mail route,
thereby making the attempted expansion illegal under the Commission's deci-
sion in the instant case. It has been suggested that the result of the Com-
mission's decision is to balk expansion by lines holding mail contracts to
the benefit of possible non-mail carriers,8 which do not come under the
restrictions of the Act.9 But this conclusion overlooks the probability that
no air service can be operated properly and profitably on a large scale with-
out the revenues obtained from government mail contracts.10 Consequently
the Commission has placed a real obstacle in the path of air transport devel-
opment.
These consequences might have been precluded by interpreting the clause
"in any way competes" to apply strictly to the off-line service itself and not
to the entire service of the carrier made available by the added route. Although
this result would strain the meaning of the words, it might be justified in
view of the industry's need for expansion to meet growing passenger traffic. 1
Since the purposes of the Act seem to be to eliminate competition costly to
the air transport business12 and to insure competition of a beneficial nature,",
it is arguable that "in any way competes" means "competes in any way
detrimental to the interests of air transportation." Unwarranted duplication
of service might amount to detrimental competition whereas development
of a shorter, more scenic, or more convenient route might be advantageous
both to the industry as a whole and to the public.' 4
7. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., San Francisco Operation, 220 1. C. C.
163 (1937).
8. Id., at 168 (dissenting opinion).
9. See Willebrandt, Federal and State Control of Air Carriers by Certificates of
Convenience and Necessity (1932) 3 J..Am L. 159.
10. The Federal Aviation Commission reported that a direct subsidy of sixteen
cents a mile would be necessary if the air transportation industry is to meet its costs.
That subsidy is now being paid through the mail contracts. SENz. Doc. No. 15, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 68. See generally BENNrr, AVIATION, ITs COMMERCIAL AND
FINAN CIAL AspF- s (1929) 37; DAviD, EcoNoxics OF Am MAIL TRANSPORTATION
(1934) 179.
11. See NEws-WEEK, Aug. 28, 1937, p. 29.
12. E.g., 48 STAT. 938 (1934), as amended 48 STAT. 1243 (1934) and 49 STAT.
618 (1935), 39 U.S.C. §469m (Supp. 1936).
13. E.g., 48 STAT. 933 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 615 (1935), 39 U. S. C. § 469a
(a) (Supp. 1936).
14. SEN. Doc. No. 15, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 61 (Report of the Federal
Aviation Commission).
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Denied one method of securing the desired terminal, T. W. A. awaited
an opportunity to avail itself of the other method of e.x-pansion provided by
the Act.' 5 On June 9, 1937 the Postmaster General advertised for bids for
a contract to carry the mail from Winslow to San Francisco. Despite the
fact that a reasonable return would seem to be about twenty-eight cents a
mile for a three hundred pound load or fraction thereof,' T. W. A. was
so desirous of procuring an entry into San Francisco in order to tap the
lucrative transcontinental passenger trade flowing from that city17 that it
submitted a bid of one mill per mile. The contract was awarded to it as
the lowest bidder.'" At the termination of the contract period, the service,
if satisfactory, will be indefinitely continued on the basis of a reasonable
return as determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission.' 0 But for
the three year period of the contract T. W. A. must operate on the contract
basis and shift the resulting loss to more profitable routes.0
The Act itself provides little protection against unreasonable rate cutting.
The Postmaster General is under a mandate to accept the lowest responsible
bid,21 the final determination of responsibility being in the hands of the
Comptroller General.2 The Postmaster General may submit any bid to
examination by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but that body is
limited expressly to deciding whether a bid is excessive.P None of these
agencies can apparently raise objections to bids which are far below the
level of a reasonable return. However, under similar provisions in the Rail-
way Mail Act, the Postmaster General refused to accept a low bid which was
less than one cent on the ground that it was not a legal bid, acceptance of
which is mandatory.24 It was argued that the government could not perform
its promise since there was no medium of legal tender small enough to pay
15. 48 STAT. 933 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 615 (1935), 39 U.S.C. § 469a
(a) (Supp. 1936).
16. The present average of the rates paid mail contractors is 28 cents a mile.
See NEws-VEsn, July 4, 1936, p. 24. T.W.A. ill receive approximately 2% cents a
trip for carrying mail from which the government may receive up to $28 in postage
per trip. NEws-Was, July 24, 1937, p. 24.
17. In 1932 up to fifty passengers a day moved transcontinentally by air from
San Francisco while only from six to ten a day made the trip from Los Angeles.
See Mn.iz, INL.A TRANsOrTATo N (1933) 708.
18. N. Y. Times, July 31, 1937, p. 13, col 8.
19. 48 STAT. 935 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 617 (1935), 39 U.S. C. § 469d (c)
(Supp. 1936). See Air Mail Rates for Route No. 33, 216 I. C. C. 381, 401 (1936);
Air Mail Rates For Route No. 31, 214 I. C. C. 387, 397 (1936)
20 Even when passenger revenues are figured in, it is inevitable that T. NV. A.
will lose money on the operation for the three year period of the contract. See Trans-
continental & Western Air Mail Bid, 223 I. C. C. 281, 284 (1937).
21. 48 STAT. 933 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 615 (1935), 39 U.S.C. §469a (a)
(Supp. 1936).
22. Ibid.
23. 48 STAT. 934, 39 U. S. C. § 469a (e) (1934); Transcontinental & Western Air
Mail Bid, 223 I. C. C 281 (1937); Inter-Island Airways Air Mail Bid, 203 I.CC.
772 (1934).
24. 14 Ops. Att'y Gen. 56 (1872).
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that amount. But this contention is unpersuasive. The government is at
liberty to provide the proper medium of payment by an act of Congress;
and even if the position is maintainable, it would invalidate only bids so in-
finitesimally low that when multiplied by the base mileage for the contract
period of payment, the result would be less than one cent. Bids of zero or
even of an affirmative sum payable to the government would present no
question of impossibility of performance nor of lack of consideration. A
promise to grant the privilege of carrying the mails would seem to be suffi-
cient consideration for a promise to carry the mails, or for a promise to
carry.the mails and pay a stipulated sum.25
Section 15 of the Act provides the only real possibility of checking rate
cutting. By that Section the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized,
upon application by the Postmaster General or any interested air mail con-
tractor, to order an air mail contractor to discontinue all unfair practices
which adversely affect the general transport business and the receipts
or expenses of another contractor. Doubtless the Commission could find
that unreasonably low bids adversely affect the general transport business
and the receipts of an interested contractor, but to term mere price cutting,
in the absence of accompanying illegalities, an unfair trade practice would
amount to a needed but novel extension of that phrase.2" Although the con-
cept of unfair competition or unfair trade practices has broadened greatly
in scope since its original application to the deceptive practice of palming
off one's goods as those of a competitor,27 some element of fraud and de-
ception,2 8 or at least an intent to injure competitors2 9 must generally be
coupled with price cutting before that practice will be subject to judicial
condemnation. The added element of local price discrimination present in
this situation brings T. W. A.'s absurdly low bid close to the borderline
of judicially recognized unfair trade practices since it involves an element of
restraint of trade. Similar local price discrimination has specifically been
denounced when used to exclude or eliminate local concerns in a program
of monopoly building.30 But it is questionable whether the Commission
25. In cases of gratuitous agency, bailment, or trust, there is no technical difficulty
in finding a consideration if the right to serve was really bargained for. Allowing
another to act as a gratuitous agent, is a detriment which will support the agent's
promise. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1936) § 138.
26. Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 67 F. (2d) 218 (C.C.A. 6th,
1933) ; see Stokes v. Newtown Creek Coal and Coke Co., Inc., 153 Misc. 352, 354,
275 N. Y. Supp. 286, 289 (Sup. Ct., 1934); NIms, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADEMARKS (3rd ed. 1929) §300; (1936) 23 VA. L. REV. 92.
27. For a discussion of this development, see Rogers, Predatory Price Cultling as
Unfair Trade (1913) 27 -ARV. L. REv. 139.
28. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A.
7th, 1919); cf. Cheney Bros. v. Gimbel Bros., 280 Fed. 746 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); Ford
Motor Co. v. Benjamin Boone, Inc., 244 Fed. 335 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
29. Cleaning & Dyeing Plant Owners Ass'n of Chicago v. Sterling Cleaners and
Dyers, Inc., 285 I11. App. 336, 2 N. E. (2d) 149 (1936); cf. Boggs v. Duncan-Schell
Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N. W. 482 (1913); see (1936) 31 ILL. L. REv. 406.
30. United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656 (N. D. Ohio 1914);
see Nmss, op. cit. supra note 26, at § 301; (1934) 34 COL. L. Rzv. 1566.
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would apply the same rationale to the present situation in the absence of
any intent to monopolize. Since the concept of unfair competition is recog-
nized as being flexible,3 ' it is entirely possible that the recent legislative
denunciations of price cutting 32 will cause the judiciary to widen the concept
to include that practice alone.
The consequences of the Commission's denial of off-line expansion in the
principal case would seem to be two-fold. In the first place, this decision
establishes the Postmaster General, through his discretionary power to let
new mail contracts, as the ultimate authority over the development of mail
carriers, for there is no apparent way to review his exercise of a purely
discretionary power. 3m And since a political appointee is more susceptible to
the influences of political pressure than is a permanent administrative body
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission,3 ' expansion under his guid-
ance may follow the lines of political expediency and not economic need.S
Secondly, the Commission's decision encourages rate cutting among mail
carriers. This practice may freeze out small competitors who are unable to
meet unreasonably low bids by shifting the resulting loss to other routes.
It will also cause a decrease in the revenues of an industry which at present
is operating on a marginal basis,30 and consequently may necessitate a reduc-
tion of expenditures on safety devices and new equipment. Since judicial
control of the situation seems impossible, the solution appears to be legis-
lation -3 7 basing the right to expand on an administrative determination of
public convenience and necessity instead of competitive bidding for mail
contracts.
31. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 532 (1935).
32. See Cupp, The Unfair Practices Act (1936) 10 So. CAIF. L REv. 18; Legis.
(1934) 34 CoL, L. REv. 1518.
33. For a general discussion of the difficulties attendant upon any attempted judicial
review of an administrative body's purely discretionary act, see DrcKNnsoN, ADM,.Is-
TRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUREMAcY OF LAw, (1927) c. III, § 5; FREUND, Anun"s-
TRATIVE POwERS OVR PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) §§ 44 ct seq., 146.
34. For this reason the Federal Aviation Commission advised that economic guid-
ance of the industry be placed in the hands of a non-partisan commission. See Sm.
Doc. No. 15, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 53.
35. The Post Office Department has often been charged with using the air mail,
and consequently the air transport industry, as a "political football." See 81 Co-;r.
Rxc., Aug. 18, 1937, at 11787, 11806; id., Aug. 16, 1937, at 11501; id., July 2, 1937,
at 8734; TIME, June 14, 1937, p. 61.
36. Though passenger mileage for the year ending in July, 1937, showed a 9.97
increase over the previous year, the air transport industry nevertheless showed a
deficit. See NEws-VEEH, Aug. 28, 1937, p. 29.
37. There are two bills now before Congress proposing different solutions to the
problem of air transport regulation. One [S. 2, H. R. 7273] would give the Inter-
state Commerce Commission the same control over air transportation which it now
exercises over railroads. The other [H. R. 8320] would place the industry under the
regulation of the Postmaster General.
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NEGOTIABILITY OF TRAVELERS CHIECXS*
ALTHiOUGH the travelers check has been in use for almost a half century,
its precise legal characteristics are as yet largely undetermined.' This unique
instrument has rarely been the subject of litigation because the issuers con-
sistently have pursued a policy of insuring saleability and negotiability by
sustaining losses upon doubtful checks. 2 This practice, together with ex-
tensive advertising of travelers checks, 3 has resulted in a widespread accept-
ance of these instruments in lieu of currency so that the travelers check now
boasts a ready negotiability throughout the world.4 A recent decision sug-
gests that the custom surrounding travelers checks has ripened into law, and
that innocent parties will receive legal protection in accepting them as a
medium of exchange. Travelers checks, duly signed by an officer of the
American Express Company but with the spaces for signature and counter-
signature unfilled and with no name inserted after the words, "to the order
of," were stolen from a bank acting as selling agent for the express company.
Subsequently, one of the thieves signed and countersigned some of these
checks with the same signature, and another bank acquired them in due
course. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, emphasizing the fact that travelers
checks pass current as money, granted the cashing bank a recovery upon the
checks against the American Express Company. Stating that the bank as
a holder in due course could assert a conclusive presumption of a valid
delivery under Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provided the
travelers checks were complete instruments at time of theft, the court found
that the checks were then complete since they had been signed by an officer
of the issuer and nothing remained to be done by the issuer or its agent.
Moreover, the rule that a bona fide holder of stolen currency has good title
was held applicable on the score that travelers checks, signed and counter-
signed with the same signature, are functionally the same as currency.
*American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trusts Co. of Anadarko, 179 Okla.
606, 67 P. (2d) 55 (1937).
1. Little analysis has been made in the few decided cases. The courts have been
satisfied merely to liken the travelers check to a cashier's check [Mellon Nat. Bank v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Camden, Ark., 88 F. (2d) 128 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937)] or to
currency [American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 67 P. (2d) 55
(OkIa. 1937)], or to find a contract relation between the issuer and the original pur-
chaser [Sullivan v. Knauth, 220 N. Y. 216, 115 N. E. 460 (1917)].
2. Peoples Say. Bank of Grand Haven, Mich. v. American Surety Co. of X. Y., 15
F. Supp. 911, 913 (W. D. Mich. 1936).
3. The travelers check is represented as a substitute for currency, self-identifying
and acceptable everywhere, but, unlike currency, it can be carried without danger of
loss in case of theft or misplacement because of the protective device of signature and
cotintersignature.
4. The American Express Company alone does a business of $200,000,000 per year.
Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from H. A. Smith, Vice-President and
Treasurer, Dec. 3, 1937.
5. American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co. of Anadarko, 67 P. (2d)
55 (Okla. 1937) (suit was brought by the Express Company to recover the proceeds




In discussing the question of completeness, the court tacitly assumed that
the travelers check6 fell within the scope of Negotiable Instruments Law,'
and that it satisfied the prerequisites to negotiability of an instrument speci-
fied in Section 1 of the Act. But it is questionable whether a travelers check
meets the requirements of that section. At the time of purchase it bears
the signatures of an officer of the issuer and of the purchaser, and contains
a promise s of the issuer to pay " . . . from... (its) . . . balance..."
a specified sum to the order of an unspecified payee upon countersignature
of the instrument. Section 1 of the Act provides that an instrument to be
negotiable must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a speci-
fied sum of money, and Section 3 further directs that -a promise to pay out
of a particular fund is not unconditional. Thus, upon delivery to the original
purchaser, the travelers check might be considered non-negotiable, for it
bears a promise to pay out of a specified fund conditional upon counter-
signature of the instrument. However, these arguments are rebuttable. Since
it is possible to view the "balance" as being merely indicative of the par-
ticular fund from which reimbursement is to be made, the issuer's promise
can be considered unconditional within the meaning of Section 3.1 Nor
should the express requirement of a countersignature necessarily render the
promise conditional. One authority has advanced the argument that a
travelers check is incomplete and inoperative until the countersignature has
been properly affixed, and that the promise of the issuer is then uncondi-
6. There are three general types of travelers checks, the A. B. A., the M.ellon, and
the American Express. For a discussion of the character of each, see NVftusmzz, Nn-
GoTriADLE INSTRU!SENTS (1931) 287 et seq.
This note is concerned only with the American Express Company's travelers
check, whose form is essentially as follows:
U. S. Dollar Travelers Cheque M 2,936,013
When countersigned below with this signature
.......................... ............... 19....
AmmicAN Exraass Coup~ANy
(Affiliated with The Chase National Bank, New York)
at its paying agencies
Pay this cheque from our balance to the order
of .......................................... $10.00
GEORGE Wsro , Treasurer
Countersign here in presence
of person cashing
.. .. . I...... .. °.. . ..
7. See notes 33-35, infra.
8. The American Express Company is both drawer and drawee [see WNLUsro.',
op. cit. supra note 6, at 291] and therefore it is primarily liable as upon a promissory
note. Grand Lodge Knights v. State Bank, 79 Fla. 471, 84 So. 528 (1920); see DAmE,
NEGOTIABLE INsTRU3.ENTs (7th ed. 1933) § 1781.
9. Section 3 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that a promise can be
unconditional although coupled with "... An indication of a particular fund out of
which reimbursement is to be" made. . . ." It has been suggested that the balance is
ifidicated merely as the source of reimbursement WVn.usTo, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 292. Cf. Torpey v. Tebo, 184 Mass. 307, 68 N. E. 223 (1903).
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tional.10 The same conclusion might possibly be reached by a different
rationale based upon a contrary view that the travelers check embodies a
complete and unconditional draft the moment it is .signed by an officer of
the issuer and that the signature, countersignature, and the accompanying de-
livery are merely acts necessary to give operative effect to the draft. Histori-
cally, the travelers .check is a consolidation of the travelers letter of credit
and separate drafts drawn pursuant to the authority created by the letter ;11
hence, for purposes of analysis, the travelers check might be dissected into
its two components. Accordingly, the original purchaser might be said to
place his signature and countersignature upon the letter of credit, not the
draft. Under this analysis, the signature and countersignature need not be
regarded as conditions to the promise of the issuer upon the draft; they
would serve merely to prove to the party cashing the check the authority
of the holder to act as agent for the issuer in delivering an unconditional
draft drawn by the issuer upon itself.
Even if the court's implied premise that the travelers check in question
complies with Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is accepted, its
holding that the bank could recover upon them does not follow as a matter
of course. Under Section 16, a negotiable instrument is revocable until it
has been delivered for the purpose of giving it operative effect, but a holder
in due course may take refuge in a conclusive presumption of a valid delivery.
Since Section 16 is qualified by Section 15,12 however, this presumption is
not available if an undelivered instrument, incomplete at time of loss or
theft, is completed without authority and subsequently obtained in due course.
Only if the maker or drawer has been negligent in handling an incomplete
instrument, will he be estopped from denying a proper delivery.' 3 In the
principal case, the issuer's transfer of the instruments to the bank, its selling
agent, did not constitute a delivery, for the issuer evidently did not intend
thereby to give effect to the checks.' 4 Since it may be assumed that neither
10. WILLISTON, op. cit. mipra note 6, at 292. In Sacred Heart Church Bldg. Com-
mittee v. Manson, 203 Ala. 256, 82 So. 498 (1919) it was held that negotiability must be
determined at time of delivery. If a travelers check is regarded as a bearer instrument
(see infra p. 474), the first delivery may be deemed to occur not upon transfer to the
original purchaser but upon delivery by the purchaser after the countersignature; but
if the purchaser is deemed the payee (see note 19, infra) transfer to him would con-
stitute a delivery.
11. See WIuisoN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 290; TRAvRS CHEQUES (publication
of the American Express Company).
12. Holzman, Cohen & Co. v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N. Y. Supp. 211 (Ist
Dep't 1916); Linick v. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N. Y. Supp. 93 (2d Dep't
1910).
13. Section 15 does not abrogate any previously recognized rules of estoppel.
Thomas v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, Mich., 7 F. Supp. 205 (E. D. Mich.
1934), (1935) 13 TEX. L. REv. 358.
14. Delivery is a matter of intention. Gasper v. Security State Bank, 109 Neb. 495,
191 N. W. 654 (1922); Delman v. Cohen, 14 N. J. Misc. 684, 186 Atd. 683 (Sup. Ct.
1936). Moreover, possession by an agent is deemed a continuation of the possession
of his principal. Lewis County v. Stat6 Bank of Peck, 31 Idaho 244, 170 Pac. 98 (1918);
Barry v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 211 Mass. 306, 97 N. E. 779 (1912).
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the issuer nor its agent was negligent in handling the instruments,"' the deci-
sion must turn upon the question of whether the instruments were complete
at time of theft. The only previous ruling upon this issue is to the effect
that although the absence of a date and the lack of a party after the words,
"to the order of," might be overlooked because of the peculiar nature of the
travelers check, a travelers check was incomplete until the purchaser affixed
his signature.' 6 This decision seems to rest upon the premise that the orig-
inal purchaser is the payee,1'7 a view apparently taken by a lower New York
Court in the only case deciding the issuer's liability to the original purchaser
for payment upon a forged countersignature.' 8 Acceptance of this premise"'
necessarily frees the issuer from liability, for the absence of a payee at time
of theft renders the instrument incomplete,20 and therefore, Section 15 be-
comes determinative.
15. It was argued that the selling agent and issuer were negligent (see Brief
for Appellees, pp. 58-66, American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 67 P.
(2d) 55 (Okla. 1937)] but no such finding was made.
16. City Nat. Bank of Galveston v. American Express Co., 16 S. V. (2d) 278
(Tex. Comm. App. 1929), aff'g, American Express Co. v. Nat. Bank of Galveston,
7 S. W. (2d) 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). For notes on the lower court decision, see
(1928) 13 Mixx. L Ray. 146; (1928) 7 TEx. L. Rav. 174. In the principal case the
court held the instruments complete because issuer and agent had nothing more to do
after the signing by the issuer's officer. This reasoning seems incorrect in view of the
fact that the drawer of an ordinary check, signed by himself but left blank in all other
respects, and intended to be delivered in that form, would apparently not be liable to a
holder in due course who obtained the instrument subsequent to a theft of it from the
drawer. NEnoiALE INsTUMtNmrS LAW § 15. That nothing more remained to be done
by the drawer would not affect the result.
17. The court's express statement that the original purchaser's signature would
render the instrument complete appears to preclude the analysis suggested by Willis-
ton [see supra note 10] under which both signature and countersignature are prerequi-
-sites to completeness.
18. Sullivan v. Knauth, 161 App. Div. 148, 146 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1st Dep't 1914)
(issuer held; but no mention of the N. I. L.), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 216, 115 N. E. 460 (1917)
(decision based on express contract of issuer to pay only upon a countersignature by
the original purchaser).
19. The original purchaser might be considered the payee to whose order the check
is drawn, for the words, "order" or "bearer", are not indispensable under Section 1(4)
of the Act which requires an instrument to be payable to order or bearer. Nelson v.
Citizens' Bank, 191 App. Div. 19, 180 N. Y. Supp. 747 (1st Dep't 1920) ; Felton v. Com-
mercial Nat. Bank, 39 Ohio App. 24, 177 N. E. 52 (1930). His countersignature could
then be considered an indorsement in blank within the meaning of Section 63. The
blank space following the phrase, "to the order of," might be considered solely for the
convenience of a party acquiring the check by negotiation who wishes to insert his
name for purposes of protection in case of subsequent loss or theft, for the instruc-
tions of the American Express Company state that when a holder seeks to cash a check
which has already been signed and countersigned, he is to indorse on the back of the
instrument and to satisfy the presentee of his identity. See Brief for Appellants, pp. 7,
9, American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 67 P. (2d) 55 (Okla. 1937).
20. Towner v. Stanley, 220 Mass. 429, 107 N. E. 1010 (1915); Moore v. Vaughn,
167 Miss. 758, 150 So. 372 (1933).
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If attention is focused upon the dual aspect of the travelers check, as
comprising both a letter of credit and a draft, the instrument more readily
can be regarded complete the moment it is signed by an officer of the issuer.
Under this interpretation, the signature and countersignature are not acts
necessary to complete the draft, but are associated with the letter of credit
aspect, serving to establish the authority of the original purchaser to deliver
the draft and thereby to give operative effect to the promise of the issuer.21
However, the absence of a payee upon the draft at the time of theft would
render it incomplete, 22 unless reliance is placed upon the fact that the checks
usually return to the issuer, and are honored by it with the space follow-
ing the words, "to the order of," left blank,2 3 and thus seem to pass as
bearer instruments. In other situations, the travelers check has been treated
as a bearer instrument. A theft of blank travelers checks is a loss within
the meaning of a blanket policy of insurance covering loss of bearer securi-
ties 2 4 and one wlo steals blank travelers checks obtains more than mere
scraps of paper and can be convicted for embezzlement.25 The custom of
leaving the space for the payee blank, together with these decisions, would
seem to support the theory that there is a complete bearer draft when the
officer of the issuer attaches his signature, and that a subsequent bolder may
claim that the draft is regular upon its face within Section 52 if the signature
and countersignature correspond. 26 If this is so, under Section 16 of the
Act the absence of delivery would be immaterial, for the instrument would
21. Williston has suggested an analysis in reference to the Mellon type of trav-
elers check by which the letter of credit aspect constitutes a promise in advance to
accept drafts drawn against that letter of credit in the fashion indicated, namely, by
countersigning the instrument. WiLuSTOir, op. cit. supra note 6, at 290. Under this
theory, since the purchaser is the drawer, the draft would necessarily be incomplete
until his countersignature was affixed. However, this analysis would not seem as readily
applicable to the American Express type of check which is in the form of an order
upon itself to pay, thus constituting the company both drawer and drawee.
22. See cases cited note 12, siupra. Cf. BIGELOW, TH LAW OF BiLLs, NOTES, AUD
CHEcxs (1928) §§ 158, 159.
23. It is conservatively estimated that over 50% of the checks return in this form.
Communication to the YALE LAW JOURrAL from the comptroller's office of the American
Express Company, Dec. 27, 1937.
24. Peoples Say. Bank of Grand Haven, Mich., v. American Surety Co. of N. Y.,
15 F. Supp. 911 (W. D. Mich. 1936).
25. People v. Cohen, 71 Cal. App. 367, 235 Pac. 658 (1925).
26. In American Express Company v. Nat. Bank of Galveston, 7 S. W. (2d) 886
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928), it was held that the absence of a payee after the phrase, "to the
order of," would prevent the travelers check from being complete and regular on its
face within § 52. The appellate court, in affirming this judgment, conceded, however,
that the instrument would satisfy § 52 though it lacked a payee. City Nat. Bank of Gal-
veston v. American Express Company, 16 S. W. (2d) 278 (Tex. Comm. Appeals
1929). However, under the bearer instrument theory, no reliance can be placed upoh
§ 23 to cut off recovery against the issuer by a bona fide holder acquiring through a
forged countersignature, and if the instrument is cleverly forged, it might be deemed
complete and regular on its face within § 52. Hence the issuer might be subjected to a
double liability, i.e., not only to the holder on the bearer draft but also to the original
purchaser on the letter of credit contract.
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be complete at time of theft.27 It is probably a departure from the provisions
of the Negotiable Instruments Law to determine an instrument's charac-
teristics by resort to the custom of treating it as a bearer instrument rather
than by examination of the face of the instrument, but in other situations
courts have not been reluctant to stretch the provisions of the Act in order
to achieve a desired result.28
A more realistic and less technical approach recognizes the fact that the
travelers check has acquired its negotiable characteristics by established cus-
tom rather than by virtue of conformity with the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law. When the Act was, drafted, the travelers check was in
its infancy,2 9 and may well have been without the scope of the Act3 0 Despite
the sweeping language of Section 1, which would seem to deny negotiability
to any instrument not complying with its requirements,3 1 bills of lading,
warehouse receipts, and stock certificates - though not within the purview
of the Act -have acquired certain features of negotiable instruments.p Thus
it is arguable that the Act is not all inclusive,33 and that Section 196 author-
izes an application of the "law merchant" to the travelers check.3 ' The "law
merchant", or custom, surrounding this unique instrument is to the effect
that any party who cashes a check upon which there is an identity of signa-
27. The conclusive presumption of delivery applies in favor of holders of stolen
paper complete at time of theft. Norden v. First Trust & Savings Bank of Pasadena,
118 Cal. App. 697, 6 P. (2d) 92 (1931); Angus v. Downs, 85 Wash. 75, 147 Pac. 630
(1915).
28. Steffen and Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds (1932) 41 YAX.n
I J. 799, 805-6.
29. The travelers check made its appearance in 1891, five years prior to the accept-
ance of the Negotiable Instruments Law by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, but not until after the turn of the century was there circu-
lation on a large scale. TRAVELERS CHEQUS, supra note 11.
30. The intended inclusiveness of the Act can be ascertained only from its words,
for the general discussion in committee and before the general council is not avail-
able. Steffen and Russell, supra note 28, at 800, n. 6.
31. Section 1 provides, "An .instrument to be negotiable must conform to the fol-
lowing requirements . . ."
32. Steffen and Russell, supra note 28, at 800; Comment (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 727, 730.
33. See Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments (1924) 24
Cot. L. REv. 563; Comments (1925) 25 Co. L Rrv. 71; (1926) 74 U. or PA. L RE7.
727.
34. "In any case not provided for in this act the rules of [law and equity includ-
ing] the law merchant shall govern." Cf. Commercial Savings Bank v. Schaffer, 190
Iowa 1038, 181 N. W. 492 (1921) (note which failed to meet "sum certain" requirement
of the Iowa Act held negotiable under the law merchant). Section 196 has been utilized
mainly in questions of suretyship. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Phillips, 120 Okla. 3, 249 Pac. 917
(1926); Clifford v. West Hartford Creamery Co., 103 Vt. 229, 153 At. 205 (1931).
In England, any instrument recognized as negotiable by merchants is treated as such.
Bechuanaland Co. v. London Bank [1898] 2 Q. B. 658; Edelstein v. Schuler [1902]
2 K. B. 144. But verbally, at least, the England Bills of Exchange Act differs from
the Negotiable Instruments law. The former is expressly limited to bills, notes, and
checks. 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61.
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ture and countersignature may collect from the issuer.3 1 In spite of the
reasonableness of this non-conceptual attack, however, it is generally con-
ceded that an instrument bearing an executory promise to pay in money is
governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law, and that an instrument which
fails to conform to the requirements of Section 1 of the Act cannot become
negotiable by the "law merchant" or business practice,30 irrespective of the
policy arguments for a finding of negotiability.37
In any event, the result achieved in the principal case seems desirable.
Since the loss must fall upon one of two innocent parties, the issuer, who
is the only party in a position to guard against theft, well might be made
to shoulder it. To require a bona fide purchaser, acting upon the representa-
tion of the issuer, to ascertain not only that signature and countersignature
are identical but also that the original signature was that of a proper pur-
chaser in the first instance,38 would seem to throw the risk upon the party
not in a position either to guard or to insure against the loss. Not only may
the issuer take precautions against theft, but it also can contract with its
selling agent for indemnification against any loss resulting from theft which
occurs after the latter has obtained possession of the instrument. 39 In turn,
the selling agent can shift the risk upon an insurance company, for the
usual blanket policy against loss occasioned by theft of bearer securities
covers a theft of blank travelers checks.40 In the last analysis, the instant
decision facilitates the development of the travelers check as a generally
accepted medium of exchange and therefore would seem to redound to the
benefit of the issuer.
35. Peoples Say. Bank of Grand Haven, Mich. v. American Surety Co. of N. Y.,
9 F. Supp. 911, 913 (W. D. Mich. 1936). Although a party cashing an ordinary check
payable to order must ascertain at his peril the identity of the indorser and the validity
of the indorsement [Joseph Heimberg, Inc. v. Lincoln Nat. Bank, 113 N. J. L. 76,
172 Atl. 528 (1934)], complete reliance may be placed on correspondence of signature
and countersignature on a travelers check.
36. Lorimer v. McGreevy, 229 Mo. App. 970, 84 S. W. (2d) 667 (1935); King
Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 199 N. W. 437 (1924) ; Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,
242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926). Amendment to limit the scope of the Act has been
suggested. See Vernier, Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law (1929)
24 ILT. L. REv. 150; Comment (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 875.
37. Manker v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 406
(1924).
38. In the principal case it was suggested that the issuer, through its selling agent,
could attest to the signature of the original purchaser. American Express Co. v. Ana-
darko Bank & Trust Co., 67 P. (2d) 55, 58 (Okla. 1937). But the difficulty of educat-
ing the public to this new technique, the expense it would entail, and the possibility of
duplicating the attestation, render this solution impracticable.
39. Mellon Nat. Bank v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Camden, Ark., 88 F. (2d)
128 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). Such a contract is not a guaranty beyond the powers of a
national bank. Ibid.
40. See note 24, supra.
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POWER OF SURROGATE TO RAISE OBJECTION TO ADLIINIsTRATRIX' CLAIMI*
IN FILING her account an administratrix submitted a personal claim against
the estate. The sole proof offered was the itemized statement of the claim in
the account and a verifying affidavit by the administratrix.1 Although the
claim was not contested by any interested parties, it was disallowed by the
surrogate. The dual position of the administratrix was held to necessitate
a departure from the rule that testimony relating to personal transactions
with the decedent, though inadmissible by statute,2 will be considered if not
contested by any interested party. Since the administratrix failed to raise
the objection against her own claim, the surrogate assumed the duty of
doing so himself. Moreover, if the administratrix' oral testimony would
be inadmissible, certainly her account and supporting affidavit were not only
inadmissible but an inadequate proof of her claim.3
Perhaps the most interesting question raised by the principal case is the
extent of the power of the surrogate to act on his own motion. Within its
statutory jurisdiction over all matters relating to the affairs of decedents, 4
a New York surrogate's court apparently can exercise the same powers as
a court of general jurisdiction.5 And one of the powers of a judge of a
court of general jurisdiction is his power to act on his own motion under
certain circumstances, provided his action does not unfairly prejudice any
part3. Thus, for the purpose of clarifying the evidence or supplying necessary
facts omitted by the parties, he may interrogate witnesses, call new ones,
or reopen the case and recall witnesses, even against the will of the parties ;O
and although evidence received without objection must generally be con-
sidered, 7 the judge may on his own motion exclude or strike out evidence
which is dearly illegal and against public policy.8 Critics of the existing
*Matter of Mary C. Van Valkenburgh, N. Y. L J., Sept. 24, 1937, p. 815, col. 1.
1. Communications to the YAiZ LAw JOURNAL from Tanner, Sillcochs & Friend,
attorneys for the administratrix, Nov. 4 and Nov. 18, 1937.
2. N. Y. CIvIL PRAcrICE Acr § 347.
3. Matter of Mary C. Van Valkenburgh, N. Y. L J., Sept. 24, 1937, p. 815, col. 1.
4. N. Y. SunoGAv's COURT AcT § 40.
5. N. Y. SURROGATE'S Conar Act §§ 20(6) (11), 40, 69, 71; see Tw -nr, NEw
YoRac ESTATES AND SUSEOGATES (2d ed. 1924) 1312 et seq.
6. Paxson Company v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 201 Fed. 656 (C. C. A. 3d,
1912); Roth v. Moeller, 185 Cal. 415, 197 Pac. 62 (1921); see 1 EARLY, Tno, soux
ON TRrALs (2d ed. 1912) § 355; WIaoRn, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §784. E.Nercise
of this power is a matter of the court's discretion. Hirschfeld v. United States, 54 F.
(2d) 62 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). The judge must act in an impartial manner, and avoid
improper questions or undue influencing of the jury. Frantz v. United States, 62 F.
(2d) 737 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); People v. DeMartino, N. Y. L J., Nov. 26, 1937,
p. 1827, col. 1 (App. Div. 2d Dep't).
7. Kinley v. Largent, 187 Cal. 71, 200 Pac. 937 (1921) (survivor testimony);
Matter of Smith, 136 Misc. 863, 242 N. Y. Supp. 464 (Surr. Ct. 1930) (survivor testi-
mony) ; see Matter of Findlay, 253 N. Y. 1, 11, 170 N. E. 471 (1930).
8. Laugharn v. Chamberlain, 139 Cal. App. 601, 34 P. (2d) 756 (1934); Monfort
v. Rowland, 38 N. J. Eq. 181 (Ch. 1884) (survivor testimony); see WxcGMoRz, EvmCE
(2d ed. 1923) § 18.
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tendency to restrict the role of the judge to that of a passive umpire have
advocated that he be allowed more freedom to function in this manner. This
recommendation seems particularly appropriate in relation to a New York
surrogate, who is viewed not merely as a presiding official but also as a
third party to the proceeding, a guardian of the estate, and a supervisor of
the conduct of executors and administrators.1° Since the proceedings before
him are largely of an administrative as well as judicial nature, the surrogate
should participate actively in the interests of a more efficient and flexible
procedure.
The surrogate undoubtedly has the power to exclude the testimony of the
administratrix in the principal case on the ground of statutory inadmissi-
bility." But the dictum that he must so act, even in the absence of any
objection, seems unnecessarily strong. The so-called "dead man statutes,"
based as they are upon an apprehension that the facts will be misrepresented
by one interested party while the counterbalancing testimony of the other
party to the transaction is unavailable because of his death, are to be criti-
cized as contrary to the modem tendency to allow interest to affect the
credibility but not the admissibility of testimony.12 Rather than use his power
to exclude the inadmissible evidence, the surrogate might well exercise his
discretion to admit and hear the evidence, if no objection is raised,13 and
thereby take advantage of the latitude in admission of evidence allowed a
judge as trier of facts.14 An honest claimant might then have the opportunity
The judge also has discretion to order a new trial of his own motion, in order to
correct his own errors of law, or where the jury has misunderstood its instructions
or rendered a verdict defective or unresponsive to the issues. Ellis v. Ginsburg, 163
Mass. 143, 39 N. E. 800 (1895); see 2 EARLY, THOmPsON ON TRIALS (2d ed. 1912)
§ 2711. Other instances of a court acting on its own motion: Pitt v. Abrams, 103 Fla.
1022, 139 So. 152 (1931) (directing verdict); People ex rel. Carr v. Murray, 357 Ill.
326, 192 N. E. 198 (1934) (statute declared unconstitutional-an unusual case).
9. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 784; Newcomer, Judicial Powers that
Should be Exercised (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 219; (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 445; (1925)
32 W. Va. L. Q. 78.
10. N. Y. SuRR. CT. ACT §§20(5), 40(3); TWYEFFORT, NEW YORK ESTATES AND
SuRRoGATEs (2d ed. 1924) 1313, 1314, 1334. There has been an increasing tendency to
interpret the surrogate's powers broadly. See Coster, The Equitable Jurisdiction of
Surrogate's Courts in New York (1936) 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 199; Wingate, The
Surrogate's Court of the State of New York, Its Early History and Present Equitable
Jurisdiction (1933) 2 BROOKLYN L. REV. 165.
11. N. Y. CIVIL PRACTIcE ACT § 347, cited supra, note 2.
12. For discussions of the "dead man statutes" see, WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d cd,
1923) § 578; Cheek, Testinwny as to Transactions with Decedents (1927) 5 Tax. L.
R-v. 149, at 171; Legis. (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 834.
13. Le., under the general rule that evidence received without objection must be
considered. See note 7, supra.
14. Since the rules of evidence were evolved for jury trials, there is not much point
in applying them strictly to a non-jury tribunal. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 4b. It has been argued that the judge must hear all the evidence anyway in deciding
on its admissibility. See Comment (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 258. This latitude in the
admission of evidence is aided by the practice of appellate courts in presuming, in the
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of establishing his claim by introducing corroborating evidence, the surro-
gate deciding on the credibility and sufficiency of the sum total of the evi-
dence.15
But the direct holding of the case seems sound. To establish his personal
claim against the estate, an executor or administrator has the burden of
proving it to the surrogate by clear and convincing proof.10 His unsupported
testimony as to transactions with the decedent is insufficient to sustain this
burden.17 An affidavit unsupported by corroborating testimony, therefore,
is even more clearly insufficient proof,'8 for it affords no opportunity to the
surrogate to pass judgment upon the witness's credibility by observing his
demeanor on the stand and by cross-questioning. The surrogate's vigilance
against unfounded claims is particularly necessary in a situation of this sort,
where no adversely interested parties appear and where there is a conflict
between the administratrix' personal interests and her fiduciary duties. 0
absence of a clear showing to the contrary, that incompetent evidence was discounted
by the trial judge, even though admitted, where there was other competent evidence
to support the decision. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kalbaugh, 18 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 9th,
1927); First Baptist Church v. Connor, 30 Ari. 234, 245 Pac. 932 (1926).
15. In the following cases there was sufficient corroborating evidence to prove the
claim: In Matter of Mower's Appeal, 48 Mich. 441 (1882); In re Browm's Estate,
60 Misc. 35, 112 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Surr. Ct. 1908); In re Knibbs' Estate, 103 App.
Div. 134, 96 N. Y. Supp. 40 (3d Dep't 1905).
The claim in the principal case was allowed on a resubmission when corroborating
evidence was produced. Communications to the YAI.n LAw JouatAL from Tanner,
Sillcocks & Friend, attorneys for the administratrLx, Nov. 4 and Nov. 18, 1937.
16. N. Y. Sum. Cr. Acr § 212; In re Gentry's Estate, 139 Misc. 759, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 296 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; see TwYrEFroar, op. di. stipra note 10, at 469. The same
rule applies where a third party seeks to prove a claim which has been rejected by the
personal representative. In re O'Donnell's Estate, 119 Misc. 590, 197 N. Y. Supp. 826
(Surr. Ct. 1922) ; see TwYEForRT, suipra, at 456, 468. But the consent of all interested
parties may eliminate the necessity for proof. Ledyard v. Bull, 119 N. Y. 62 (1890).
17. In re Marcellus' Estate, 165 N. Y. 70, 58 N. E. 796 (1900) ; Matter of Milligan,
112 App. Div. 373, 98 N. Y. Supp. 480 (2d Dep't 1906). Contra: Matter of Porter,
60 Misc. 504, 113 1T. Y. Supp. 928 (Surr. Ct. 1903). Sometimes, as in the principal
case, reliance is placed upon the inadmissibility of the testimony under the "dead man
statute!' as an additional ground. Keller v. Stuck, 4 Redf. 294 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1880) ;
Matter of Lannon, 75 Misc. 66, 134 N. Y. Supp. 974 (Surr. Ct. 1911); Matter of
Kahn, 140 Misc. 532, 251 N. Y. Supp. 23 (Surr. Ct. 1931). Testimony by a third party
in support of his own claim has likewise been held insufficient proof. I-Eckok v. Bunting,
67 App. Div. 560 (lst Dep't 1902).
18. Williams v. Purdy, 6 Paige 166 (N. Y. Ch. 1836); Underhili v. Newburger,
4 Redf. 499 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1881) ; Matter of Smith, 75 App. Div. 339, 78 N. Y. Supp.
130 (2d Dep't 1902). Contra: Matter of Griffin, 210 App. Div. 564, 206 N. Y. Supp.
581 (3d Dep't 1924). Section 76 of the Surrogate's Court Act, to the effect that except
as otherwise provided by law, a petition, affidavit, or account filed in a special pro-
ceeding shall be due proof of the facts therein stated, unless controverted by answer,
objection, or other proof, must be interpreted in the light of Section 212, which requires
that a personal representative prove to the surrogate his claim against the estate.
19. Matter of Kahn, 140 Misc. 532, 251 N. Y. Supp. 23 (Surr. Ct. 1931); cf.
Matter of Wallace, 68 App. Div. 649 (4th Dep't 1902). Contra: Matter of Porter,
60 Misc. 504, 113 N. Y. Supp. 928 (Surr. Ct. 1908).
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The same strictness should be, and usually is, extended to cases where the
personal representative fails to raise adequate defense against the claim of
a third party, either through favor or actual collusion.20
RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF INSOLVENT GUARANTY COMPANY AND
PARTICIPATION CERTIFICATE HOLDERS*
A MORTGAGE guaranty company acquired a single bond and mortgage,
retained a part interest for its own investment, and issued and guaranteed
a series of participation certificates representing assignments of shares in the
balance. When the company subsequently became insolvent, the proceeds of
the mortgage security proved insufficient for full payment to the holders of
the certificates. The liquidator of the mortgage company, as holder of the
company's retained interest, claimed a right to share in the distribution of
the proceeds pro rata with the holders of the guaranteed certificates. The
Court of Appeals, however, affirming the decision below,' held that the
certificate holders had a prior right to payment out of the proceeds of the
mortgage.2 The Court found that the "special equities" arising from the
guaranty by the assignor raised a presumption of intent to prefer the assignees
and that, in the absence of an actual expression of intent to the contrary, the
insolvency of the guarantor could not deprive the assignees of their priority.
Moreover, this presumed intent was reenforced by a finding of actual intent
implied in a clause of the certificate giving the company the right to retain
out of the proceeds of the mortgage "so much as may remain after paying
to the holder" 3 of the certificate whatever may be due him. Another clause
of the certificate, providing that "the share assigned by this certificate shall
be a coordinate lien with all other certificates of said mortgage now or here-
after issued and any share retained by the company",4 was held only to
render "less clear" the inference that the parties contemplated preferred
treatment to the certificate holders.
The established rule has been that if there are any contractual provisions
in the certificate bearing on the relative priorities of the claims of the mort-
gage company, as assignor of part interests in a mortgage bond, and of the
20. It; re O'Rourke, 12 Misc. 248, 34 N. Y. Supp. 45 (Surr. Ct. 1895); In re
Gellis' Estate, 141 Misc. 432, 252 N. Y. Supp. 725 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
*In re Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347,
9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937).
1. It re Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 249 App. Div. 484,
293 N. Y. Supp. 4 (3d Dep't 1937).
2. It re Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347,
9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937).
3. Italics supplied by the Court in quoting from the certificate.
4. Italics supplied by the Court in quoting from the certificate.
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certificate holders, as assignees, they are controlling.5 Whatever determina-
tion of the actual intent of the parties is to be gathered from the terms of
the certificate involved in the principal case would seem to be in favor of
pro rata distribution. The New York Supreme Court, interpreting the pro-
visions of a similar certificate, had earlier held that the clause comparable to
the one relied on by the Court in the instant case "was not intended to cover
the rights of the company as owncr of ccrtificates, but merely its rights irre-
spective of its ownership of any certificates." ' It would seem that this so-
called "residuum clause" was intended to protect the rights of the company
in the event that it pursued the customary practice of paying interest and
principal due the guaranteed certificate holders before receiving payment
from the mortgagor." This provision, therefore, should have no bearing upon
the question of priorities upon insolvency of the company. The "coordinate
lien" clause should control that issue, for unless this clause is construed to
place the company's share of the bond and mortgage on a parity with all
others, it is rendered "superfluous and meaningless".8
If the terms of the certificate do not provide a clear and unambiguous
solution of the problem, as is implied by the Court's inquiry into presumed
intent, a pro rata distribution of the proceeds of insufficient security would
seem the most equitable procedure. 9 Since the assignor has power to issue
other certificates of coordinate lien up to the amount of the principal sum
secured by the mortgage, the assignee cannot reasonably ex'pect to be secured
5. Matter of New York Title and Mortgage Co. (Series F\V-1), 157 Misc. 271,
283 N. Y. Supp. 553 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 248 App. Div. 715, 290 N. Y. Supp. 351
(1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 556, 4 N. E. (2d) 734 (1936) ; Matter of Lawyers Mortgage
Co. (545 West End Ave.), 157 Misc. 813, 284 N. Y. Supp. 740 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd,
248 App. Div. 715, 290 N. Y. Supp. 129 (1936),.aff'd, 272 N. Y. 554, 4 N. E. (2d)
733 (1936); Morgan v. Kline, 77 Iowa 681, 42 N. NV. 558 (1889).
6. Matter of Lawyers Mortgage Co. (Simon Borg), 151 Misc. 744, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 390 (Sup. Ct. 1934); aff'd without opinion, 242 App. Div. 617, 271 N. Y. Supp.
1074 (1934), leave to appeal denied, 265 N. Y. 508, 193 N. E. 294 (1934). Under the
terms of the certificate the company had the right to retain any excess of interest above
the guaranteed rate and likewise "the right to retain out of the proceeds of the col-
lection of said bond and mortgage so much as may remain after paying whatever ay
be due to the assured on principal and interest on this certificate." 151 Misc. 744, at
745, 272 N. Y. Supp. 390, at 391.
7. See VAw ScrAxic, FnxA. REPORT ou THE ADM=.mIsnATzozz OF TME DzugwtNT
Trrrn. Am MoRTGAaE GuARANrY CoMPANmEs ... uzm~n ms Sun mzmzNcV (May
10, 1935) 28. The company has the right to reimburse itself for such advances from
subsequent payments by the mortgagor of overdue installments of principal and interest.
Matter of People (Lawyers Title and Guaranty Co.), 265 N. Y. 20, 26-27, 191 N. E.
720, 722 (1934); Matter of People (N. Y. Title and Mortgage Co.), 265 N. Y. 30,
191 N. E. 723 (1934).
8. Matter of Lawyers Mortgage Co. (Simon Borg), 151 Misc. 744, 745, 272 N.Y.
Supp. 390, 391 (Sup. Ct. 1934). And see REsTATEsENT, ComAcrcs (1932) § 236a.
9. Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 At.
823 (1934), aff'd for reasons stated in opinion below, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 At.
706 (1934). Contra: Louisville Title Co. v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 249 Ky. 736,
61 S. W. (2d) 615 (1933).
1938] NOTES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
by the underlying mortgage beyond the amount of his pro rata share of the
proceeds.10 When the assignment is not accompanied by the assignor's
guaranty, the assignor and assignees share pro rata." The addition of a
guaranty should alter the situation only to the extent that it gives the cer-
tificate holders a right to file a claim against the guarantor on a parity
with fhe unsecured creditors.12 When the assignor-guarantor is solvent,
however, the assignees may be accorded priority to avoid circuity of action.13
This follows from the fact that if a pro rata share of the mortgage proceeds
is insufficient to pay the assignee in full, the guaranty requires the guarantor
to make up the deficiency, and this-by hypothesis-he is in a position to do.
Priority of distribution to the assignee in this situation is simply a procedural
device for enforcing the obligation of the solvent guarantor without the in-
conveniences of a separate suit. But where the assignor is insolvent, so that
the question becomes one of substantive rights, granting to the assignee a
priority for which he has not contracted has an undesirable impact upon two
interested groups. First, it gives the assignee a preference at the expense of
the unsecured creditors. Secondly, and more important, since the amount
of unsecured creditors' claims is usually comparatively small, 14 the ruling
has the effect of preferring the holders of certificates in a single bond and
mortgage in which the mortgage company happened to hold a large share
at the time of liquidation over the holders of certificates in other bonds and
10. An equitable assignment of a pro rata share of the mortgage is held to follow
the assignment of part of the bond or notes. See Domeyer v. O'Connell, 364 Ill. 467,
477, 4 N. E. (2d) 830, 835 (1936); Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Mortgage Com-
mission, 273 N. Y. 415, 422, 7 N. E. (2d) 841, 844 (1937). The assignees of part
interests in the bond or notes secured by a single mortgage, as between themselves,
share pro rata in the proceeds. Conway v. Yadon, 132 Okla. 36, 269 Pac. 309 (1928),
(1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 266.
11. Domeyer v. O'Connell, 364 Ill. 467, 4 N. E. (2d) 830 (1936), (1937) 31 ILL.
L. REV. 1111; Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Mortgage Commission, 273 N. Y. 415,
7 N. E. (2d) 841 (1937), (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1010. For earlier rule, now repudiated,
see Lawson v. Warren, 34 Okla. 94, 124 Pac. 46 (1912).
12. For purposes of computing claims to be allowed in liquidation of a mortgage guar-
anty company, a holder of participation certificates based upon a single mortgage has
been treated not as an owner of a part interest in the underlying mortgage asserting
a claim against the company as guarantor, but as a secured creditor of the company;
and, as such, has been required to deduct the value of his security, i.e., his interest in
the mortgage. In re New York Title and Mortgage Co., 160 Misc. 67, 80, 289 N, Y.
Supp. 771, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 251 App. Div. 415, 297 N. Y. Supp. 52 (1st Dep't
1937). But cf. Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee and Trust -Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592,
600, 171 Atl. 823, 827 (Ch. 1934), aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Atl. 706 (1934).
13. See Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592,
599, 171 At]. 823, 827 (Ch. 1934); aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Atl. 706 (1934); cf.
Preston v. Morsman, 75 Neb. 358, 372, 106 N. W. 320, 325 (1905).
14. See Louisville Title Co. v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 249 Ky. 736, 739,
61 S. W. (2d) 615, 617 (1933). General creditors' claims amounted to approximately
1% of the assets of the Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, as of
Dec. 31, 1931. MooDY's MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS (1934) 1694.
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mortgages in which the company held a smaller share.15 Since the purchasers
of guaranteed mortgage participation certificates relied not so much on the
worth of the mortgage security as on the credit standing of the company,"'
and since a substantial part of the company's assets consisted of retained or
reacquired shares,17 the certificate holders should have equal rights of satis-
faction from all the assets of the insolvent company for their deficiency claims
remaining after receipt of their pro rata shares of the mortgage securities.
INTRA-UNION DISPUTES CONCERNING UNION FUNDS*
ALTHOUGH conflicts within the labor movement have presented problems
of increasing public importance during the last few years,' courts have been
reluctant to take jurisdiction over intra-union disputes.2  Members are re-
quired to exhaust their administrative remedies within the union before
applying to the courts unless pursuit of these remedies would be dearly
futile. The applicant for relief also must show that his property rights have
been affected, but since the term "property right" may comprise any of the
numerous rights and privileges incidental to membership in a union, this
requirement can seldom be invoked to bar resort to the courts. Once juris-
diction of the issues has been established, courts commonly regard constitu-
tion, charter, and by-law provisions as a contract which defines the legal
relations of members and officials. Thus, action authorized under union rules
will generally be enforced, but courts do not feel bound by the terms of
clearly unreasonable constitutional provisions. Such constitutional mandates
15. Section 173 of the N. Y. INsuRAEcn LAw requires a "guaranty fund" equal
to two-thirds of the company's capital stock, in which the guaranty holders are given
priority over other creditors. Section 173, as amended by N. Y. LAws 1933, c. 318,
allowed the company to invest this "guaranty fund" in retained shares of mortgage
bonds. As to the retained shares included in such a "guaranty fund!', in which the
general creditors would not be likely to have an interest because of the vast amount
of outstanding guarantees, the decision in the instant case emphasizes the inequalities
between certificate holders. But since the companies did not segregate the "guaranty
fund" from the rest of their assets [ALGER, MORTGAGE CO~MPAhNzs Invm=.r=Ozi R0ro.r
(1934) 18 et seq., 1311, it is doubtful whether the courts will allow the guaranty holders
a preference over the unsecured creditors.
16. Alger, op. cit. supra note 15, at 94, 103, 110; Rzms, FALsE SEcunrr (1937)
60, 63.
17. Retained or repurchased shares evidently made up a large part of the com-
panies' assets, which consisted mainly of mortgage bonds and real estate. See Awrn,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 15 et seq.
*Low v. Harris, 90 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
1. See Pressman, Appointment of Receivers for Labor Unions (1933) 42 YAME
L. J. 1244; Comments (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1248, (1935) 44 YAMX L. J. 1446; (1930)
30 Co L. REv. 1025.
2. For a thorough treatment of the principles controlling judicial review of intra-
union disputes discussed in the text, see Comment (1936) 45 YA= L J. 1248, 1260
et seq.
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will either be disregarded entirely, or concepts of due process and natural
justice will be implied. Since union regulations rarely provide for every
dispute which may arise, and since even those rules which do apply may on
occasion be ignored, the result is that courts exercise a considerable discretion
in their determination of members' rights and ordinarily decide individual
cases according to the particular equities involved.
Illustrative of this judicial discretion are the cases involving allocation of
the funds of a local union which dissolves or otherwise severs connections
with the parent body. Resort to the courts may always be had in these cases,
since property interests are clearly involved, but difficulties are often en-
countered in determining what factors should control the ultimate disposition
of the fund. Thus, in a recent case, members present at a special meeting
of a United Mine Workers local voted unanimously to sever relations with
the U. M. W. and affiliate with a rival union, the Progressive Miners.
Shortly thereafter fifteen members who had not attended the meeting regained
the charter and reorganized the local. Constitution, charter, and by-law pro-
visions directed that on disbandment or revocation of a local's charter its
property should be taken over by the parent, that funds should in no case
be divided among the members or donated to an unauthorized cause, and
that seven members should constitute a quorum. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a decree awarding the funds to the
reorgdnized U. M. W. local, on the grounds that the U. M. W. local had
not been dissolved and that no valid transfer or distribution of the local funds
was possible under the union constitution and by-laws and in view of the
general nature of the union organization.3
Union constitutions typically provide that the property of a local must
be forfeited to the parent in case of dissolution, suspension, or secession of
the local.4 Such provisions have generally been recognized as valid and in
proper cases will be enforced,5 but the courts have been ingenious in devising
methods of avoiding their effect. Like other forfeiture provisions, they are
3. Low v. Harris, 90 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
4. In the following cases typical forfeiture provisions were involved, applicable
to various types of situations, as indicated: Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269
Pac. 455 (1928) (voluntary surrender of charter, or reclamation by president of parent
association); McCarty v. Cavanaugh, 224 Mass. 521, 113 N. E. 271 (1916) (disband-
ment); Tiffany v. Mooney, 263 Mass. 264, 160 N. E. 808 (1928) (dissolution or
forfeiture of charter); Donovan v. Danielson, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N. E. 823 (1930)
(secession). Many of the cases involving disposition of local funds have concerned volun-
tary, or unincorporated non-profit associations, but the same legal concepts are applicable
to these associations and to labor unions. See WRiGHTiNGTOx, UNINCORPORATED AssocIA-
TIONS AND BusrNEss TRUSTS (2d ed. 1923) 288; Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associa-
tions Not For Profit (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 993, 1001, 1016, 1021.
5. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank, 254 Ill. App. 264 (1928);
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Williams, 211 Ky. 638, 277 S. W. 500 (1925);
Local Union No. 76 v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 143 La.
901, 79 So. 532 (1918); Grand Court v. Court Riverside, 102 N. J. Eq. 447, 142 Al.




always strictly construed, and they have been held not to apply when the
courts regard them as unreasonable per se or as operating unfairly.0 Thus,
the forfeiture provisions were not enforced when the funds were collected
for a purely local purpose,7 where the procedure for suspension was not
properly followed, where a specified contingency had not arisen,0 and where
the local had seceded unanimously and continued its existence as an entity."'
Moreover, courts sometimes imply terms requiring notice, a hearing, and
the right to appeal before a local can be suspended by the parent, and hold
ineffective a suspension which has not complied with these terms."
When a constitution contains no forfeiture provision or where the provi-
-sion has been declared inapplicable, the courts are left entirely to the expe-
diencies of the particular case. In these instances, several factors seem to be
of controlling importance. Perhaps the most significant of these is the purpose
for which the funds were contributed to the local body. If they were col-
lected for general association purposes or for the purposes of a local as
affiliated with the parent, they will usually be awarded to the parent or to
the loyal remnant of the local, and the majority of the local membership
will not be allowed to withdraw them or transfer them to a rival organiza-
tion.1 But if the funds are considered as a trust for the beneficial or char-
itable use of the local organi7ation, they will ordinarily be awarded to which-
ever party - parent, loyal minority, or withdrawing group - can best apply
them to the purposes for which they were designedl1 A second factor is
6. Swaine v. Miller, 72 Mo. App. 446 (1897) (by-law allowing suspension and
interference with property rights of local without notice or hearing) ; Donovan v. Daniel-
son, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N. E. d23 (1930); Grand Court v. Court Germania, 192 Mich.
380, 158 N. W. 832 (1916). In these cases the forfeiture would have diverted purely
local funds from their purpose. Some courts have refused to admit the validity of
forfeiture provisions and have refused to enforce them as against public policy. Goodman
v. Jedidjah Lodge, 67 Md. 117, 9 AtL. 13 (1887); Vicksburg Lodge v. Grand Lodge,
116 Miss. 214, 76 So. 572 (1917) ; Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112 (1857).
7. Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269 Pac. 455 (1928); State Council v.
Enterprise Council, 75 N. J. Eq. 245, 72 At. 19 (1909); State Council v. Emery, 219
Pa. 461, 68 At. 1023 (1903).
8. Grand Court v. Court Cavour, 82 N. J. Eq. 89, 88 At. 191 (Ch. 1913), aff'd,
83 N. 3. Eq. 343, 91 At. 1068 (1914); Reichert v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America, 14 N. J. Misc. 106, 183 At. 728 (CI. 1936) ; Green v. Gravatt,
19 F. Supp. 87 (NV. D. Pa. 1937).
9. Grand Lodge v. Reba, 97 Conn. 235, 116 At. 235 (1922) ; McCarty v. Cavanaugh,
224 Mass. 521, 113 N. E. 271 (1916).
10. Donovan v. Danielson, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N. E. 823 (1930); Grand Court
v. Court Germania, 192 Mich. 380, 158 N. NV. 832 (1916).
11. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. Francis, 79 Cal. App. 383, 249 Pac. 539
(1926); Green v. Gravatt, 19 F. Supp. 87 (f. D. Pa. 1937).
12. Brownfield v. Simon, 94 Misc. 720, 158 N. Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. 1916);
Minor v. St. John's Union Grand Lodge, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 100, 130 S. V. 993 (1910).
13. Donovan v. Danielson, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N. E. 823 (1930) (to seceding
group); Schubert Lodge v. Schubert Verein, 56 N. J. Eq. 78, 38 At. 347 (Ch. 1897)
(to loyal minority); Shipwrights', Joiners' & Calkers' Ass'n, Local No. 2 v. Mitchell,
60 Wash. 529, 111 Pac. 780 (1910) (to seceding local). Where the funds are awarded
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the nature of the severance between the parent and the withdrawing group.
When a majority of the local secedes, the funds are generally given to the
minority continuing the former branch. 14 But when secession is unanimous,'
or where the local is suspended by act of the parent,10 the funds are often
awarded to the seceding group, and, a fortiori, this is true when the action
of the parent was arbitrary.' 7 A valid dissolution of the local is an infrequent
occurrence, since it usually requires a unanimous vote of the members present
upon due. notice of the meeting, and can be blocked by a constitutional
quorum, whether present or not ;18 when it occurs, however, the funds can-
not be distributed among the members, but must be held in trust by the
parent organization which can best effectuate the intent of the parties by
whom they were contributed. 19 A third consideration is the purpose of the
secession. If the local joins a rival union, the property may be retained by
the parent or by the minority continuing the local. 20 But if there is a split
in the parent organization and the local adheres to one faction, it will probably
be permitted to retain its property as against the claim of the other faction,2 1
A final factor is the character of the local branch. If the branch is clearly
autonomous and continues its existence as an independent entity, it can take
the funds ;22 if a true subordinate branch, it often may not.
The forfeiture provision was inapplicable in the instant case, since a valid
dissolution was effectively blocked' by the prompt action of a minority larger
than the minimum constitutional quorum, and all that occurred was a ma-
jority withdrawal to which -the forfeiture provision was not intended to apply.
But the result may be sustained on the basis of the tests enumerated above.
to the parent, a forfeiture provision in the parent constitution and a trust for the
original purposes are usually made concurrent grounds for the decisiQn. Tiffany v.
Mooney, 263 Mass. 264, 160 N. E. 808 (1928); Grand Lodge v. Wieland Lodge, 93
N. J. Eq. 129, 115 Atl. 205 (Ch. 1921).
14. Koerner Lodge v. Grand Lodge, 146 Ind. 639, 45 N. E. 1103 (1897); Brown-
field v. Simon, 94 Misc. 720, 158 N. Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Polish Falcons'
Ass'n v. Kubiak, 238 Pa. 464, 86 Ati. 296 (1913); Phillips v. Widow's Son Lodge,
152 Va. 526, 147 S. E. 193 (1929). Contra: Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269
Pac. 455 (1928).
15. See cases cited note 10, supra.
16. Grand Lodge v. Reba, 97 Conn. 235, 116 Atl. 235 (1922); Vicksburg Lodge
v. Grand Lodge, 116 Miss. 214, 76 So. 572 (1917); Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112
(1857); Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N. Y. 232 (1891).
17. See cases cited notes 8 and 11, sipra.
18. Sabourin v. Lippe, 195 Mass. 470, 81 N. E. 282 (1907); Brownfield v. Simon,
94 Misc. 720, 158 N. Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
19. Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H. 536 (1838); Grand Council v. McPherson, 8 D. L. R.
672 (Nova Scotia Sup. Ct. 1912).
20. Schubert Lodge v. Schubert Verein, 56 N. J. Eq. 78, 38 Atl. 347 (Ch. 1897);
Grand Court v. Hodel, 74 Wash. 314, 133 Pac. 438 (1913).
21. State Council v. Enterprise Council, 75 N. J. Eq. 245, 72 Atl. 19 (1909);
Wolfe v. Limestone Council, 233 Pa. 357, 82 Atl. 499 (1912).
22. Moyer v. Butte Miners Union, 232 Fed. 788 (D. Mont. 1916); Schweitzer v.
Schneider, 86 N. J. Eq. 88, 97 Atl. 159 (Ch. 1916), aff'd, 86 N. J. Eq. 256, 98 Ati.
1086 (1916).
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The funds were dearly contributed for general union purposes, since they
were the source of substantial taxes and assessments by the parent organiza-
tion.2 Nor was there any arbitrary action on the part of the parent in
forcing the secession of the recalcitrant branch, for this branch voluntarily
left the parent body in order to join a rival union. Lastly, the local was
a true subordinate member of a closely knit hierarchy and could not be con-
sidered an autonomous unit holding absolute title to its funds. This result
appears desirable for other reasons. The growth of unionism is largely
dependant upon well disciplined local organizations and financially responsi-
ble parent bodies. But the effect of permitting local unions to withdraw and
take their funds might well encourage random rebellions and further inter-
and intra-union strife; and the withdrawal of funds by groups of members
would seriously impair the financial structure of existing parent organizations
which must rely entirely upon the dues collected from their affiliated local
unions. 24
WITHDRAWAL OF RENUNCIATIONS BY TESTAMENTARY BENEFIcARIEs *
A RECENT case relaxes the usual rule that election to accept or reject a spe-
cific bequest by a beneficiary under a will is final and irrevocable if made with
knowledge of the facts and without fraud or duress.' Testator failed to
provide in his will for his children but left virtually his entire estate to his
sister. After protests and threats of contest by the children, the sister filed
a renunciation of the testamentary gift in the probate court. She subsequently
moved to withdraw her disclaimer. The court held that she might withdraw
unless it appeared upon trial that she had contracted not to claim under the
will or that third parties had changed their positions in reliance upon her
renunciation.'
In determining the legal interests of persons designated as beneficiaries
in a will, the courts have commonly relied upon two principal theories. Some
23. See U. M. v. Constitution, art. XIV, §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, 7; By-laws of Local 1421,
art. VII, § 2 (Appellate record in the principal case) p. 100; Report of International
Sec.-Treas., U. M. NV., for Dec. 1, 1925--June 1, 1926, and for June 1, 1926--Dec. 1,
1926; Auditor's Report, U. M. V., for Dec. 1, 1923-June 1, 1924, and for June 1, 1924
-Dec. 1, 1924.
24. The equities in the primcipal case may arouse sympathy for the seceding group.
The secession was a part of a general rank and file rebellion in Illinois in 1932-1934
against the union leadership after the latter had signed a wage contract with the
operators which was so unpopular with the men that they voted it down in a referendum.
See 135 NATION 155 (Aug. 1932).
* In. re Johnston's Will, 298 N. Y. Supp. 957 (Surr. Ct., 1937).
1. Craven v. Craven, 181 Ky. 428, 205 S. AV. 406 (1918); In re Bailey's Estate,
285 Pa. 403, 132 At. 343 (1926); Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn. 312, 137 S. NV. 96
(1911); see ATEmsoN, ,Vn.s (1937) 725.
2. In re Johnston's Will, 298 N. Y. Supp. 957 (Surr. Ct., 1937). Accord: In re
Young, [1913] 1 Ch. 272.
1938] NOTES 487
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
speak in terms of the vesting of title to the property bequeathed, holding
that title vests in the legatee or devisee immediately upon the death of the
testator, subject to divestment by the donee's disclaimer of the gift.3 But
the harshness of the implications of this rationale has led to its modification
in certain situations. Thus, when attempts have been made to levy a transfer
tax upon the passage of title to a disclaiming donee, the courts have generally
declared that the tax could not be levied on the ground that renunciation
"related back" to the death of the testator and prevented title from vesting,4
In like fashion, when creditors have sought to attach the donee's interest and
have claimed that the donee could not then renounce because renunciation
would amount to a gratuitous transfer in fraud of creditors, the courts have
been reluctant to limit the donee's power of disavowal, and have usually em-
ployed the "relating back" fiction to evade the logical result of their rationale,5
The other analysis commonly employed by the courts describes a bequest as
an "offer" capable of being accepted or rejected by the donee. 6 But this
consensual analogy is not an apt one, for a testamentary transfer is not con-
tractual in the ordinary commercial sense.7 Not only does the "contract" lack
consideration or an equivalent therefor, but the "offer" is not terminated by
the offeror's death 8 and can be "accepted" by an incompetent.0 Whichever
of these two theories the court may happen to accept, the result is to deprive
the beneficiary of any chance to reconsider his renunciation of a bequest.
Under the "vesting" theory, renunciation operates to deprive the donee of
title which he cannot later reassert ;1O under the contract analogy, rejection of
3. Northrop v. Columbian Lbr. Co., 186 Fed. 770 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911); Triba v.
Lass, 146 Wis. 202, 131 N. W. 357 (1911); see 4 SCHOULEII, WxLLS, EXECUTORS, AND
ADmINISTRATORs (6th ed. 1923) § 3155. But see Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa 500, 503,
119 N. W. 529, 531 (1909).
4. People v. Flanagin, 331 II1. 203, 162 N. E. 848 (1928); Tax Commission of
Ohio v. Glass, 119 Ohio St. 389, 164 N. E. 425 (1928). Nor is such a renunciation a
gift made in contemplation of death. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A.
6th, 1933).
5. Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N. W. 20 (1922); Bradford v. Cal-
houn, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502 (1908). Contra: Kearley v. Crawford, 112 Fla. 43,
151 So. 293, (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 1030. Similarly, a renunciation by a cestui que trust
has been held to relate back to the declaration of the trust and to deprive claimants
against the cestui of any rights in the trust property. Stoehr v. Miller, 296 Fed. 414
(C. C. A. 2d, 1923), (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 789.
6. Arnold v. Livingston, 157 Iowa 677, 139 N. W. 927. (1913); Albany Hospital
v. Albany Guardian Society and Home for the Friendless, 214 N. Y. 435, 108 N. E. 812
(1915) ; see RooD, WILLS (2,d ed. 1926) § 757b; (1932) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 443.
7. Cf. HARRIMAN, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1901) § 83; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PRorERTY'
(2d ed. 1920) § 463.
8. Indeed, there is no "offer" until the death of the testator, for, at any time prior
thereto, he may revoke the will and thus withdraw the "offer".
9. Inter vivos transfers to incompetents are effective despite their inability to ac-
cept. Campbell v. Kuhn, 45 Mich. 513 (1881) ; see 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.
1920) § 463. A fortiori testamentary transfers to incompetents would seem to be ef-
fective.
10. In re Mahlstedt's Will, 140 Misc. 245, 250 N. Y. Supp. 628 (Surr. Ct., 1931);
Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502 (1908).
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an offer terminates forever the power to accept 11 The only discretion re-
maining to the court is the determination that the renunciation was made with
full knowledge of the facts and that no fraud or duress -was involved.'
The general rule that elections of testamentary beneficiaries are final does
not rest solely upon the basis of these conceptualistic analogies. Underlying
judicial declarations of finality is the desire to make titles to decedents' prop-
erty more secure and thereby end litigation.13 Important as this policy may
be, however, it does not seem to justify a rigidly applied rule which prevents
reconsideration of elections irrespective of the equities of the particular case.' 4
Renunciations are often made without due consideration of the consequences
and are likely to be influenced by emotional circumstances surrounding the
testator's death. Moreover, strict enforcement of renunciations is hardly cal-
culated to execute the purpose of the testator, who normally intends that the
testamentary beneficiary shall receive his property. By disregarding concep-
tual notions and by emphasizing factual considerations, the court in the prin-
cipal case suggests a more flexible standard by which the elections of testa-
mentary beneficiaries may be judged. Nor does the decision appear to en-
danger the security of titles or encourage the protraction of litigation, for,
if any third person should rely upon the renunciation of a bequest, the bene-
ficiary will be denied the right to change his mind.
APPEALS BY THE STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS*
AN APPEAL by the state in a criminal proceeding is a comparatively novel
development in Anglo-American law. In England, prior to the American
Revolution, neither the accused nor the crown bad the right to appeal from
11. See Matter of Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238, 245, 74 N. E. 82, 884 (190S);
In re Johnston's Will, 298 N. Y. Supp. 957, 960 (Surr. Ct., 1937) ; RoOD, Vms (2d ed.
1926) 729. But a rejection of an offer is not effective until it is received by the offeror.
RE.STATEtENxT, CoNTRACTs (1932) § 39. Since "testator-offerors" cannot receive "rejec-
tions", even a court unreservedly applying the "offer" rationale might permit withdrawal
of "rejections" until there had been some action in reliance thereon.
12. Thus, a misconception of the rights and interests conferred by the will has been
described as a "misconception of fact." Waggoner v. Waggoner, 111 Va. 39-5, 63 S. .
990 (1910); see Tolley v. Poteet, 62 V. V. 231, 246, 57 S. E. 811, 818 (1907). The
doctrine seems to rest upon the idea that there can be no real election where there is
a misconception of the results of the choice. In re McFarlin, 9 Del. Ch. 430, 75 At. 281
(Orphan's Ct., 1910); Hanson v. Clark, 246 IIl. App. 496 (1927).
13. Craven v. Craven, 181 Ky. 428, 205 S. W. 406 (1918); State cx rel Burns v.
Romjue, 136 fo. App. 650, 118 S. W. 1188 (1909); In re Bailey's Estate, 285 Pa. 403,
132 A. 343 (1926).
14. See In re Dunphy's Estate, 147 Cal. 95, 105, 81 Pac. 315, 319 (1905) ; Williams
v. Williams, 161 Ky. 55, 60, 170 S. NV. 490, 491 (1914) ; Owens v. Andrews, 17 N. M.
597, 609, 131 Pac. 1004, 1006 (1913).
* Palko v. Connecticut, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937).
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a conviction or an acquittal of a felony.1 The only remedy originally avail-
able to the convicted felon was resort to the king's pardoning power, which
was employed first as a gratuity to favorites and later as a corrective of in-
justices and irregularities of trial.2 Pardons subsequently developed into
writs of error obtainable from the Attorney General, but since the issuance of
these writs was purely discretionary, they could not be obtained by the accused
as a matter of right.3 Indeed, the granting of such a writ was tantamount to
an acquittal of the crime, for the crown would never require a second trial,
when of its own volition it had nullified conviction in the first.4 Unlike
felons, persons convicted of misdemeanors became entitled to a writ of error
as of right by the beginning of the eighteenth century. In these cases, how-
ever, a reversal on appeal was sometimes followed by a second trial of the
accused, who might otherwise be freed because of a merely technical error
in the original proceedings.6 , When the plea of autre fois convict and acquit
- predecessor of our constitutional guaranties against double jeopardy 7 -
1. The Rioters' Case, 1 Vern. 175 (Ch. 1683); see Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527,
2550 (K. B. 1770); King v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 619, 638 (K. B. 1796); cf. Crawle v.
Crawle, 1 Vern. 170 (Ch. 1683). See SIBLEY, CRIMINAL APPEAL AND EVIDl NCE (1908)
66.
2. See Proceedings in Parliament against Sir John Fenwick, 13 How. St. Tr. 538,
662 (House of Commons 1696); Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770);
GRAHAM, NEW TRIALS (1834) 505.
3. Mrs. Gargraves' Case, 1 Rolle 175 (K. B. 1616); The Rioters' Case, I Vern.
175 (Ch. 1683); Domina Regina v. Paty et aL., 2 Salk, 504 (Q. B. 1705); see Rex v.
Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF Eu-
LISH LAW (2d ed. 1905) 479 et seq.
4. See Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770) ; King v. Mawbey, 6 T. R.
619, 636 (K. B. 1796) ; cf. King v. Fowler, 4 B. & Aid. 273, 275 (K. B. 1821) ; United
States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,321 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1823). See GaHAMx, NEW
TRIALS (1834) 505 et seq.
5. Domina Regina v. Paty et at., 2 Salk, 504 (Q. B. 1705) (this case established
the accused's right to a writ of error in misdemeanors) ; see King v. Mawbey, 6 T. R.
619, 636 (K. B. 1796) ; cf. King v. Inhabitants of Burbon, 5 M. & S. 391 (K. B. 1816).
Prior to the eighteenth century, writs of error were discretionary in the case of
misdemeanors as well as felonies. Mrs. Gargraves' Case, I Rolle 175 (K. B. 1616);
Crawle v. Crawle, 1 Vern. 170 (Ch. 1683); cf. Marquis of Winchester's Case, Cro.
Car. 504 (K. B. 1639); Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770).
6. The Queen v. Drury and others, 3 Cox C. C. 544 (Q. B. 1849); cf. Rex v.
Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770). There is authority to the effect that neither
the common law pleas nor the constitutional guaranty of double jeopardy were origin-
ally available in misdemeanors. See People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 201 (N. Y.
1820); cf. Marquis of Winchester's Case, Cro. Car. 504 (K. B. 1639); King v. In-
habitants of Wandsworth, 1 B. & A. 63 (K. B. 1817); Birmingham v. Williams, 229 Ala.
101, 155 So. 877 (1934), (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 308; Commonwealth v. Prall, 146
Ky. 109, 142 S. W. 202 (1912). See GRAHAM, NEW TRIALS (1834) 505; WILLIS, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 521.
7. 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWNr (1st Am. ed. 1847) 240; JAcoB, Com,,xoN LAW
COMMON-PLACED (1726) 7; WHARTON, CRIMIN L PLFADI1G & PRACTICE (9th ed. 1889)
354. At common law, jeopardy did not attach until verdict was rendered. 2 HALE, supra,
at 243. Cf. Jackson et at. v. Superior Ct., 67 P. (2d) 384 (Cal. App. 1937).
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was raised in bar of this second trial, the courts usually held that by exer-
cising his right of appeal the defendant had waived all immunity to further
prosecution for his crime.8
In America, persons convicted of either misdemeanors or felonies have
always been allowed to appeal.9 When an appeal results in a reversal of a
previous conviction, the waiver theory is generally invoked to permit a second
trial.'0 Some courts, however, have refused to apply this theory where an
accused has been convicted of a lesser crime than that contained in the indict-
ment and have limited the effect of the implied waiver to the lesser offense,
thus barring subsequent conviction under the greater charge.1" Moreover,
the whole theory of waiver has at times been criticized on the ground that
it entails the relinquishment of a fundamental constitutional guaranty.12 Al-
though the right of appeal in criminal proceedings is generally limited
to defendants,' 3 Connecticut 14 and Vermont" have passed statutes which
allow appeals by the state. Neither of these states has a double jeopardy
clause in its constitution, but the validity of both statutes has been contested
on the ground that an accused is protected from second jeopardy on retrial
by due process of law. The courts of both states have upheld the statutes,
however, but not on the theory of waiver, which was clearly inapplicable.
Vermont has held that protection against double jeopardy is not so funda-
mental a right as to warrant application of either the "law of the land"
clause of the Vermont Constitution or the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 6 Connecticut, on the other hand, has held that no
question of double jeopardy was involved because the entire prosecution,
from the beginning of the first trial to the final unreversed conviction, con-
stituted one proceeding.17 The constitutionality of the Connecticut statute
has recently been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court for the
first time. The accused was charged with murder in the first degree but was
convicted of murder in the second degree. On appeal by the state, the court
8. See cases cited note 6, supra.
9. United States v. Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5126 (C. C. D. Pa. 1799); 1 Bis-op
CaIMrmAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 1001.
10. Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521 (1905) ; In re Keenan, 7 Wis. 695 (1859).
Although logically the waiver should extend to appeals by the state from a judg-
ment of an intermediate court reversing conviction, the usual holding is otherwise.
Ohio v. Kondak, 46 Ohio App. 422 (1933).
11. Stuart v. Commonvealth, 28 Gratt. 950 (Va. 1877); McLeod v. State, 174 So.
466 (Fla. 1937); (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1160. Contra: Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U. S.
284 (1910); REsTATE xT, AD , INIsTRATzo OF CimaxAL LAW (1935) § 14.
12. This theory seems to run counter to the principle that one cannot be forced to
waive a constitutional guaranty to gain a statutory privilege. See the dissenting opinion
by Justice Holmes in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 135 (1904). See, also,
Comley, Former Jeopardy (1926) 35 YALE L J. 674.
13. See notes 25 and 27 infra. Cf. (1892) 1 YALE L. J. 231.
14. CoNN. GF.. STAT. (1930) § 6494.
15. VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) § 2425.
16. State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 Ad. 23 (1918), (1919) 28 YAn L. J. 403; In re
Dexter, 93 Vt. 304, 107 At. 134 (1919).
17. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265 (1894), (1895) 8 HAv. L. REv. 354.
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reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. At the
second trial the accused was found guilty of murder in the first degree and
was sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed by the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors, and the defendant appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. The court, however, refused to sustain his contention that
the second trial constituted a deprivation of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, upheld the statute and sustained the conviction.18
In determining the constitutionality of the statute in the principal case,
the Supreme Court might have predicated its decision on either one of two
rationales. It could have considered the original trial, reversal, and retrial
as one proceeding and hence obviated all question of double jeopardy, or it
could have held that the procedure provided by the statute was not such
an unreasonable deprivation of the rights of the accused as to be prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although no logical objection can be found
to the "one proceeding" argument, the court refused to uphold the statute
on this ground largely because of a previous decision in which a similar trial
had been recognized as a separate proceeding. 19 By basing its decision on
the second rationale, the court necessarily held that the constitutional guaranty
against double jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment 20 is not included in the
protection afforded by the Fourteenth. In relying upon a somewhat tenuous
distinction between those guaranties of the Bill of Rights which are essential
to the preservation of society and hence are to be protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and those which are not so essential, the court
refused to include double jeopardy in the former class.21
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment itself, aside from any question of
the incorporation of the guaranties of the Bill of Rights, necessarily preclude
the possibility of a retrial. Among the various factors which have been
considered influential in determining whether a statute meets the require-
ments of due process of law is the status of the right involved at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution.m Since second trials of an accused after
reversal on appeal were unknown at that time, at least in the case of felonies,
there would seem to be little historical justification for holding that a plea
of double jeopardy would have prevented such a trial.3 More pertinent to
any consideration of the validity of a statute, however, is the reasonableness
of its application to the facts of the particular case. There would seem to be
no strong doubts concerning the constitutionality of the instant statute on
this score. As pointed out in the opinion, the statute does not require suc-
cessive trials of a person validly acquitted of a crime; all the state demands
is that it be entitled to one proceeding free from error and not reversible on
18. Palko v. Connecticut, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937).
19. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (1904).
20. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment limits only the federal
government. 1 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LImiTATioNs (8th ed. 1927) 66; NViLas,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 642.
21. Cf. 2 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LneITATIoNs (8th ed., 1927) 736.
22. See e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 521 (1884); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U. S. 510, 524 (1927); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60 (1932).
23. See note 4, supra.
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appeal. When the statute is so limited it is difficult to argue that the accused
is being deprived of any fundamental right, -4 the abridgement of which
would be shocking to our accepted standards of liberty and justice.
Since the decision is restricted so closely to the facts of the instant case,
it could not be considered controlling in another case presenting a similar
statute passed under varied circumstances. For instance, the court's assump-
tion that a rdtrial constitutes a second jeopardy within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment would not necessarily prevent a state which had a double
jeopardy clause in its Constitution from passing a statute permitting both
sides to appeal.25 The validity of such a statute would necessarily depend
upon the state court's construction of its own Constitution, which might well
follow the "one proceeding" rationalization adopted in Connecticut. Nor does
the decision require the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment can
never be invoked to prevent successive jeopardies of an accused, and should
a statute attempt to sanction a second trial where no error had been found
in the original proceeding, the Amendment would undoubtedly be held to
apply. As the decision is limited, however, it would seem to facilitate a much
needed reform in criminal law. Because of the one sided right of appeal
that normally exists in a criminal trial, counsel for defense are notoriously
unrestricted in their conduct before the court.2 0 By making the right of
appeal mutual, the state is enabled to obtain correction of errors which cannot
otherwise be curbed. It is well recognized that the so-called moot appeal-
-the only method by which the state may now secure the correction of an
error of law -is generally unsatisfactory, since the mere correction of an
error without the possibility of a second trial does not afford the prosecution
sufficient incentive to take the appeal. Although statutes permitting appeals
by the state are subject to abuse in the form of possible frivolous appeals
and resultant hardship on the accused, practical considerations centering
around the cost of taking the appeal and the prosecutor's desire to avoid
reversal would seem to nullify whatever objections might be raised on this
score.28
24. See State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 At. 23 (1919).
25. Several states having a double jeopardy clause in their constitution have passed
statutes which have been construed as permitting the state to appeal in certain speci-
fied cases. These statutes have generally been held unconstitutional. See State v. Felch,
92 Vt 477, 482, 105 Atl. 23, 25 (1919).
26. See Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases (1926) 36 YAm L. J. 486,
496.
27. Moot appeals may be permitted: (a) as a means of determining the constitu-
tionality of a statute; (b) for the purpose of securing determinations of questions of
law for use as precedents; or (c) to secure a better or more uniform administration
of the criminal law. Such appeals, however, have no effect upon the judgment appealed
from. See Miller, supra note 26, at 488. For an evaluation of this method of appeal,
see Hicks, Moot Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases (1928) 7 Oa L. Rzv. 218.
28. See Miller, mpra note 26, at 497-50D.
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DEDUCTIBILITY OF CHARITABLE PLEDGES IN COMPUTATION
OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX*
A RECENT case raises once again the problem of the deductibility of char-
itable pledges in computing the federal estate tax. Decedent promised to
transfer $2,000,000 to a university to establish a memorial fund for the
,teaching of the humanities, and meanwhile to pay the university annually
amounts equal to interest on the fund at the current rate. During the year
which elapsed between her pledge and her death she made the interest
payments. Thereafter her estate continued the payments. She also promised
sums to other institutions for the employment of two musicians by a sym-
phony orchestra, for the employment of a director by a museum, and for
the increase of a teacher's salary, all of which would have been impossible
had the money not been given. Her estate continued these payments as
well. Although the recipients admittedly had enforceable claims against the
estate, the court refused to allow deductions for the pledges in calculating
the federal estate tax, either under Section 303 (a) (1)1 of the Revenue Act,
which provides for the deduction of "claims against the estate" contracted
"bona fide and for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth," or under Section 303(a)(3),2 which allows the deduction of
transfers to charitable or educational institutions. Deductions were allowed,
however, for certain pledges 3 made to charities "in. consideration of the
gifts of others" contingent on the pledges of others equalling or exceeding
the amount pledged, on the ground that there was adequate consideration
within Section 303 (a) (1).4
Since Congress has always encouraged gifts to charities by allowing the
deduction of inter vivos gifts from the gross income5 and testamentary gifts
from the gross estate0 of the donor in calculating the net amount taxable,
the absence of a specific statutory allowance for the deduction of executory
pledges to charities from the gross estate is somewhat difficult to under-
stand. Although the omission might be explained on the ground that taxa-
tion of charitable gifts unexecuted at the donor's death has less tendency
to discourage gifts to charities than taxation of inter vivos or testamentary
gifts of that character,7 the history of Section 303 (a) (1) indicates no inten-
*Taft v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 92 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
1. REV. AcT of 1926, 44 STAT. 72 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 412(b) (1934).
2. Id., 26 U. S. C. § 412(d) (1934).
3. These pledges were to a museum for current expenses, to an orchestra, and a
church. Robert A. Taft, 33 B. T. A. 671, 677-8 (1935).
4. Taft v. Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
5. REV. Acr of 1934, §§23(o), 120, 48 STAT. 690, 26 U. S. C. §23(o) (1934);
48 STAT. 718, 26 U. S. C. § 120 (1934). Similar provisions were contained in former
acts. REV. AcTs of 1918, 1921, §214(a) 11; REV. AcTs of 1924, 1926, §214(a) (10);
REv. Acrs of 1928, 32, § 23(n).
6. See note 2, supra. Similar provisions are to be 'found in prior acts. REV. AcTs
of 1918, 1921, §403(a) (3); REv. Acr of 1924, §303(a) (3).
7. The donor may contemplate paying the pledge in full before his death by a
series of transfers for which income tax deductions will be granted.
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tion to include charitable claims within its scope. The progressive changes
in the wording of that section reveal only an apparent objective of Congress
to achieve a formula which would allow deductions for the claims of private
parties for which they have given full value, and on the other hand prevent
the deduction of claims representing private gifts and testamentary disposi-
tions; s claims asserted by charitable organizations seem not to have been
within its compass. In order to prevent the deduction of enforceable claims
resulting from transactions whose purpose was to avoid taxation, the defini-
tion of "deductible claims" was narrowed in successive revenue acts from
"claims against the estate . . . allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction
• . . under which the estate is being administered . . . "I' to claims "in-
curred or contracted bonm fide and for a fair consideration in money or
money's worth."'1 When "fair" was subsequently construed to mean only
"reasonable"' and not necessarily "full and adequate!' 1 consideration, the
clause was again modified to include only claims contracted "bona fide and
for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. ' 1 3  To
render it certain that tax-avoiding or gift transactions did not escape taxa-
8. See Carney v. Benz, 90 F. (2d) 747, 748 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937).
9. REv. AcT of 1921, §403(a) (1), 42 STAT. 278 (1921). Under this statute the
face amount of notes representing private gifts was held deductible because the notes
were enforceable under state law. In re Atdns Estate, 30 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 5th,
1929). Under the later acts the validity of the contract alone will not support a
deduction. Porter v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), aff'd on other
grounds, 288 U. S. 436 (1933); Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 30 B. T. A. 679
(1934); Charles B. Bretzfelder, 32 B. T. A. 146 (1935); see Smith v. United States,
16 F. Supp. 397, 402 (D. Mass. 1936).
10. REv. Act of 1924, §303(a)(1), 43 STAT. 305 (1924).
11. Cf. Phillips v. Quitchel, 27 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
12. Ferguson v. Dickson, 300 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S.
628 (1924). This case held that a claim for an amount accepted in lieu of dower was
deductible. Later such claims were held not deductible, because the wife took under
the will and therefore had no claim against the estate. Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F. (2d)
233 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) cert. denied, 280 U. S. 603 (1929), (1930) 39 YA.= L. J.
436, (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 132, (1930) 4 TuL. L. REV. 313; Schuette v. Bowers,
40 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), (1930) 30 CoL. L. Ruv. 1072. Section E04 of the
Revenue Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 280 (1932), 26 U. S. C. § 412(b) (1934), provides that
the relinquishment of marital rights is not sufficient consideration to support a deduction.
13. See note 1, supra. Deductions for claims for which full value was not received
have generally been refused under the 1924 and 1926 Acts. Old Colony Trust Co. v.
United States, 15 F. Supp. 417 (D. Mass. 1936) (gift notes); Boston Safe Deposit
and Trust Co., 30 B. T. A. 679 (1934) (essay prizes); Henry Adams Ashford, 30
B. T. A. 1306 (1934) (gift mortgage). Claims arising from ordinary business trans-
actions have been allowed, as have tort claims. Robinson v. Phillips, 41 F. (2d) 71
(M. D. Pa. 1930) (notes); commissioner must rebut presumption of consideration;
United States v. Mitchell, 74 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) (indemnity contract);
Smith v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 397 (D. Mass. 1936) (tort claim; stockholder's
liability); Carney v. Benz, 90 F. (2d) 747 (C. C A- 1st, 1937) (guaranty). See
U. S. Treas. Reg. 80 (1934) Arts. 30, 36. See in general MoNuowmy" mm MACILL,
FEnzW. T~xzs ox EsTATEs, TRusTs AND Grrrs (1935) 193 et seq.
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tion, some courts have interpreted the statute to mean that the consideration
for a deductible claim must either augment the estate of the decedent, grant
him a privilege or right not previously possessed by him, or operate to
discharge an existing claim against him.' 4 Others, construing the Act more
narrowly, have held that the claim must arise from a business transaction. 1
When a claim for the amount of an unpaid pledge to a charitable institu-
tion has been in issue, these holdings on non-charitable claims have sometimes
been abandoned. In those cases in which the promise is given to the charity
"in consideration of the gifts of others," a deduction has been allowed on
the theory that the "gifts of others" constitute adequate consideration in
money. 16 This formula is accepted despite the fact that no consideration
passes either from the promisee or to the promisor and that the promisor
knows neither the person whose pledge makes his binding nor the amount
of that pledge. In England "gifts of others" are considered not even suffi-
cient consideration to support a promise,17 and American jurisdictions hold
them to be sufficient consideration only because of the policy favoring chari-
table institutions.' 8  In view of the attenuated interpretation necessary to
sustain this result, the court's refusal to permit a deduction for the other
pledges in the instant case, including the $2,000,000 one, seems inconsistent.
Whether the pledge is independent or in consideration of the gifts of others,
it accords no financial benefit to the decedent's estate. In either case, the
value of the estate is diminished by the same amount. Consequently, some
rationale of broader applicability should be advanced to support the deduction
of all charitable claims. One suggestion, rejected in the instant case, has
been that "money's worth" need not be something material, but may consist
of the satisfaction afforded to and motivating donors to religious, charitable
14. Latty v. Comm'r, 62 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933), (1933) 21 Gvo. L. J.
508; Glaser v. Comm'r, 69 F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S.
654 (1934).
15. Porter v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), supra note 9; see
Carney v. Benz, 90 F. (2d) 747, 749 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937). It was also early ruled
that the consideration must move to the decedent. U. S. Treas. Reg. 70 (1929 ed)
Art. 36; see Latty v. Comm'r, 62 F. (2d) 952, 954 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933), (1933)
21 GEo. W. L. REv. 508. This was, however, held error [Comm'r v. Kelly's Estate,
84 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 603 (1936); see cases
cited note 16, infra], and the requirement was stricken from the Regulations. T. D.
4322, 31 T. D. Int. Rev. 86 (1931).
16. Jeptha H. Wade, 21 B. T. A. 339 (1930), overruling sub silentio Mechanics'
Bank of New Haven, 20 B. T. A. 1033 (1930); Comm'r v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co.,
87 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) ; Margaret Day, 34 B. T. A. 11 (1936) (agreement
underwriting certain amount, in consideration of others joining in the agreement).
Where the pledges of others were not given until after the death of the promisor, the
deduction was disallowed. Cyrus H. McCormick, 13 B. T. A. 423 (1928), rev/d oil
another ground, Comm'r v. McCormick, 43 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A, 7th, 1930). The
"gifts of others" doctrine is applicable only to charitable pledges. Central Union Trust
Co. of N. Y., 24 B. T. A. 296 (1931) (marriage settlement).




or educational institutions. 10 A more acceptable theory would be that the
implied or express promise of the pledgee to use the money for the specified
purposes is "full and adequate consideration."' 0
Some courts, construing Section 303(a) (1) to preclude the deduction
of unexecuted charitable pledges as claims in the absence of the "gifts of
others" phrase, have turned to Section 303(a)(3) and held the amount
deductible as a "constructive transfer" to a charitable institution.2 Under
this theory it is arguable that the $2,000,000 pledge was deductible in the
instant case: the establishment of the Memorial Fund and the payment of
interest on the principal sum would be equivalent to a transfer of the full
amount, as though the principal had been in the university's possession and
had been invested in a loan back to the promisor at the current rate of
interest. However, the constructive transfer theory has been confined to
cases in which a partial transfer has taken place before the death of the
promisor, and was rejected entirely in the instant case.
Under the present wording of the statute, the courts must distort the letter
to fit the spirit of the law either by invoking the strained constructive transfer
theory or by adopting a different standard in determining what is a "full and
adequate consideration" from that used in deciding upon the deductibility
of non-charitable claims. The more satisfactory solution would seem to be
amendment of the statute.
19. Turner v. Comm'r, 85 F. (2d) 919, 920 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936), (1936) 50 HAMs. L.
REv. 363, (1936) 23 VA. L. REv. 348.
20. It has,also been suggested that the contracting of debts by the charity in
reliance on the subscriptions should be considered full and adequate consideration.
Comm'r v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 87 F. (2d) 607, 609 (C C. A. 3d, 1936). However,
action in reliance has been rejected as consideration. Porter v. Conm'r, 60 F. (2d)
673 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), mipra note 9.
21. Porter v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), supra note 9; Lock-
wood v. McGowan, 13 F. Supp. 967 (V. D. N. Y. 1936). But see Glaser v. Comn'r,
69 F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 654 (1934). The con-
structive transfer theory has also been used where the court thought the amount equally
deductible as a claim. Turner v. Conm'r, supra note 19. The amount is not deductible
where the gift is made on condition precedent, and the condition is not complied with
at the death of the promisor. United States v. Fourth Nat. Bank in Wichita, Kan.,
83 F. (2d) 85 (C C A. 10th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 575 (1936).
22. Taft v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 92 F. (2d) 667, 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
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